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JUST THE FACTS:
THE FIELD CODE AND THE CASE METHOD
WILLIAM P. LAPIANA*
I.
The basic outlines of the story of the founding of New York Law
School are a well known part of the history of American legal education.
Angered by the abandonment of the "Dwight Method"' of legal education
in favor of the Harvard case method,2 the faculty of the Columbia Law
School and many of its students withdrew en masse to the new institution.
Less well known is the struggle to establish the new school as a totally
independent institution; a story told for the first time in James Wooten's
article appearing in this issue of the New York Law School Law Review.
It is a story of conflict between government control and the desire to be
let alone; between the desire to close legal education to a privileged few
and to keep it open to all those who wished to train themselves for the bar
in an academic setting. The school's triumph was a fittingly New York
result-a shrewd application of political power in the service of
opportunity.
In the longer run, the impulse behind the creation of New York Law
School carried the day, despite efforts by case method law schools to raise
requirements for admission to law school beyond the reach of the vast
majority of New Yorkers, and to destroy night schools in the name of
promulgating an exclusive and narrow vision of the profession. Schools
such as New York Law School, with the cooperation of much of the bar
* Associate Professor of Law, New York Law School.
1. ROBERT STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL LEGAL EDUCATION IN AMERICA FROM THE 1850S
TO THE 1980S, at 29 n.2 (1983). Theodore Dwight, a Columbia University law professor,
was the originator of the "Dwight Method," which consisted of teaching law through
reading treatises and classroom recitation. Id.; see also infra notes 303-07 and
accompanying text.
2. See STEVENS, supra note 1, at 52-55. Christopher Columbus Langdell, Dean of
Harvard Law School from 1870 to 1895, introduced the case method as a new form of
lawyer training, establishing what would become the blueprint for teaching at American law
schools. The case method is based on the assumption that legal principles are best derived
from appellate court opinions, the applicability of which is not bounded by state lines.
Under Langdell's guidance, the case method consisted of analyzing appellate decisions in
terms of doctrinal logic. The case method was considered the primary alternative to the
"Dwight Method." Id.; see also infra notes 246-52 and accompanying text.
3. See James A. Wooten, Law School Rights: The Establishment of New York Law
School, 1891-1897, 36 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 337 (1991).
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itself, firmly established their right to offer legal education to those
excluded from more prestigious institutions.' In the substance of what is
taught, however, most American law schools have come to mirror the elite
institutions of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 5 The case
method was firmly established as the dominant form of classroom
instruction very early on.6 Indeed, even the founder of New York Law
School, George Chase,' believed that students should read "a moderate
number of cases, to illustrate the practical application of the legal rules
and principles" found in text books.'
The reasons for the triumph of the case method are several, and are
related to both changing ideas of science and university education, as well
as to changes in the practice of law itself. This latter relationship has
never been thoroughly investigated. The perceived wisdom, in fact, has
long denigrated the case method as a peculiar product of Christopher C.
Langdell's bizarre personality.9 This view ignores the fact that Langdell
practiced law for more than ten years in New York City in the 1850s and
1860s.1' His practice immersed him in one of the greatest changes
wrought on the common law in the nineteenth century: the Field Code of
Civil Procedure." The centennial of New York Law School is a fitting
4. See STEVENS, supra note 1, at 24-25.
5. For an interesting discussion of the different approaches to teaching law and the
future of legal education in American law schools, see Robert A. Stein, The Future of
Legal Education, 75 MINN. L. REV. 945 (1991).
6. See STEVENS, supra note 1, at 26-27.
7. Prior to the founding of New York Law School, George Chase was a professor of
law at Columbia Law School. For an account of the events that led to Chase's resignation
from Columbia, see Must the Law School Go, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 1891, at 8.
8. George Chase, A Comparison of the Use of Treatises and the Use of Case-Books
in the Study of Law, 3 AM. L. SCH. REV. 81, 83 (1912). Chase also published a torts
casebook entitled Leading Cases upon the Law of Torts.
9. The locus classicus of this view is the work of Jerome Frank. See, e.g., Jerome
Frank, A Pleafor Layer-Schools, 56 YALE L.J. 1303, 1303 (1947) (calling Langdell "a
brilliant neurotic" and asserting that "[hlis pedagogic theory reflected the man"); Jerome
Frank, Wy Not a Clinical Lawyers-School?, 81 U. PA. L. REV. 907, 907 (1933) (stating
that Langdell's case method of legal instruction "may be said, indeed, to be the expression
of that man's peculiar temperament"). A notable exception to this strain of commentary
is an excellent article by Anthony Chase. See Anthony Chase, Origins of Modem
Professional Education: The Harvard Case Method Conceived as Clinical Instruction in
Law, 5 NOVA L.J. 323, 342 (1981) (stating that Langdell's primary aim was "the
development of systematic and comprehensive, university-based professional education").
10. Langdell's experience in practice is often forgotten. In a 1927 report, the Yale
Law School faculty, for example, asserted that Langdell had never practiced law. See
LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE, 1927-1960, at 109 (1986).
11. For an in-depth analysis of the Field Code, see infra notes 85-108 and
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time to try to recapture this relationship between New York State and the
development of legal education.
This article elucidates this relationship by first describing the centrality
of the common law writ system to legal education before the Civil War.
It then presents the coming of the Field Code, and shows its two-fold
effect on legal practice. First, the Code made the facts of cases of primary
importance. Second, and somewhat ironically, the courts' treatment of the
Code reinforced the regime of the common law forms of action, giving
impetus to the kind of legal science Langdell practiced-the search in
decided cases for the principles that governed the granting of relief in the
courts. Finally, this article links the explosion of law reporting, first in
New York and then nationwide, with the practical usefulness of the case
method as it came to dominate legal education.
H1.
Formal legal education in the antebellum period was based on the
reigning idea of legal science that accommodated law to the generally held
conception of science as an inductive process designed to analyze facts,
extract broad principles, and thus elucidate the mind of the Creator. 2
Legal education, like all higher education, trained the Christian gentleman
to live properly in the world. At its heart, legal argument involved
applying a system of broad ordered principles to the specific problems that
led to arguments before the courts. 3
Mastery of the science of ordered principles, however, was not all that
the lawyer needed. Getting into court involved a thorough knowledge of
another aspect of legal science, the science of common law pleading and
procedure that governed the daily practice of the law. Whatever untutored
simplicity may have marked the administration of the common law in the
American colonies in the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, by
the mid-1700s growing numbers of lawyers were applying an increasingly
sophisticated system of pleading-or at least one more closely
approximating that of the mother country-in their daily practice.1"
accompanying text.
12. For a detailed discussion of the inductive and the deductive theories of legal
science, see Thomas C. Grey, Langdell's Orthodoxy, 45 U. PITT. L. REV. 1, 6-24 (1983).
13. See William P. LaPiana, Swift v. Tyson and the Brooding Omnipresence in the
Sky: An Investigation of the Idea of Law in Antebellum America, 20 SUFFOLK U. L. REV.
771, 771-78 (1986).
14. For some explanation of this early practice, see DAVID T. KONIG, LAW AND
SOITY IN PUmTAN MASSACHUSETS: EssEx COUNTY, 1629-1692, at 58-62 (1979)
(finding the simplicity of land litigation procedure in Essex County the result of "a
sophisticated adaptation of the common law"), and Bruce H. Mann, Rationality, Legal
1991]
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An impression of the effect of these changes can be gleaned from an
examination of William Wyche's Treatise on the Practice of the Supreme
Court of Judicature of the State of New-York in Civil Actions, published
in 1794."5 For more than three hundred pages, Wyche expounds the ins
and outs of carrying on a civil trial in the young state. Although actual
practice may not have replicated Wyche's description, his work indicates
that aspiration had reached a high level. Even at the lowest levels of the
colonial legal system, proper procedure seems to have been honored, if
perhaps not always practiced. For example, in the mid-eighteenth century
a popular manual for Justices of the Peace, Conductor Generalis, included
explanations of eleven common law actions.16 This sort of material was
not included in the English models on which this and similar colonial
manuals were based.17 The latest student of this literature finds in this
fact a conscious attempt to-preserve common law forms "[i]n the absence
of a fully developed legal system and the general availability of law
books." 8  These changes did not go unnoticed, and the post-
revolutionary generation held their immediate ancestors' accomplishments
in the field of procedure in high esteem.
Addressing the bar of Worcester County, Massachusetts, in 1829,
Joseph Willard praised the members of the pre-revolutionary bar for their
technical competence that improved upon the English models: "Consider
the clear and concise forms of declarations [the opening pleading in a suit
at law], and of special pleading, in which all the English redundancy is,
with singular boldness, at once cut off .. ..,, Of course, what Willard
saw as admirable terseness might have been regarded by some of his
heroes' contemporaries as the result of insufficient knowledge.2"
Change, and Community in Connecticut, 1690-1760, 14 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 187, 201,
207-12 (1980) (implying that the simplicity of the procedure used in debt cases in early
eighteenth-century Connecticut was, in part, the product of the small scale of economic life
and a resulting lack of interpersonal relations based 'solely or primarily on the debtor-
creditor relationship).
15. WiimuAm WYCHE, TREATISE ON THE PRACTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT OF
JUDICATURE OF THE STATE OF NEW-YORK IN CIVIL ACTIONS (New York, T.&J. Swords
1794).
16. See John A. Conley, Doing It by the Book: Justice of the Peace Manuals and
English Law in Eighteenth Century America, 6 J. LEGAL HIST. 257, 263-65 (1985).
17. Id.
18. Id. at 267-68.
19. Joseph Willard, An Address to the Members of the Bar of Worcester County,
Massachusetts 79 (Oct. 2, 1829) (transcript available in Columbia Law School Library).
20. See WILIAM E. NELSON, AMERICANIZATION OF THE COMMON LAW: THE IMPACT
OF LEGAL CHANGE ON MASSACHUSETTS SOCIETY, 1760-1830, at 69-88 (1975).
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Writing in 1840 of Massachusetts law from the late seventeenth
century to the Revolution, Emory Washburn found that "[tjowards the
latter part of the period of which I have been speaking, the forms of
pleading and practice became generally as correct as they have ever since
been." 2 Washburn also testified to the accomplishments of the pre-
revolutionary generation in the realm of pleading: "Those who are
familiar with the forms of legal proceedings in Massachusetts will recal
[sic] the great number of precedents that are now in use, that were
originally drawn by leading members of the bar before the revolution. "22
Modem scholarship agrees with the implications of Washbum's
assessment of his professional ancestors. For example, Herbert Johnson
has written that
[c]ivil practice in New York in the last decade of the colonial
period was fairly close to the English pattern, both in common
law and equity courts .... To properly plead a case and bring
the matter to issue in any of the above courts required a thorough
knowledge of procedure, which then, as now, was drawn from a
variety of court rules and statutes.?
After an exhaustive study of the surviving Massachusetts court records,
William Nelson similarly concluded that "[e]xcept in actions to try title to
land, the common law forms of action were in full vigor in the
prerevolutionary period. "24
Why this should be so probably is not susceptible to simple
explanation. The expanding commercial life of the colonies both increased
legal business and brought practitioners into more frequent contact with
English ways of doing things.2Y A general desire to mimic English ways
seems to have appeared in many aspects of colonial life after the mid-
1700s and certainly had its effect on the legal profession.' The desire to
be members of a truly learned profession led many lawyers to organize
bar associations and formal study groups and to attack pettifoggers and
21. EMORY WASHBURN, SKECHES OF THE JUDICIAL HISTORY OF MASSACHUSETS
190 (Boston, Little & Brown 1840).
22. Id. at 196.
23. HERBERT A. JOHNSON, Chvil Procedure in John Jay's New York, in ESSAYS ON
NEW YORK COLONIAL LEGAL HISTORY 159, 169-70 (1981).
24. NELSON, supra note 20, at 72.
25. See Mann, supra note 14, at 207-08.
26. See John M. Murrin, The Legal Transformaton: The Bench and Bar of Eighteenth
Century Massachusetts, in COLONIAL AMERICA: ESSAYS ON POITICS AND SOCIAL
DEVELOPMENT 415 (Stanley N. Katz ed., 1971).
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other unlearned practitioners.' At the early state bar of Maryland, in
fact, a young Roger Taney found that the highest praise was reserved for
masters of the art of pleading. "In that day," he wrote,
strict and nice technical pleading was the pride of the bar, and I
might almost say of the Court. And every disputed suit was a trail
of skill in pleading between the counsel, and a victory achieved
in that mode was much more valued than one obtained on the
merits of the case.'
Practicality and fashion marched hand in hand, leading a parade of
colonial lawyers to a closer examination of English precedents of pleading
and of substantive law as well.'
Whatever the reasons for the increased importance of pleading and the
traditional forms of action, the effect of the change on the student of law
was marked. John Adams studied Roman law to impress established
lawyers whose patronage he needed,' and certainly won the aid of at
least one of them, Jeremiah Gridley. 3 Adams lost his first case,
however, because he was unable to properly draw the necessary
pleading.32 Unable to find a precedent, Adams did his best with what was
27. See, e.g., GERARD W. GAWALT, THE PROMISE OF POWER: THE LEGAL
PROFESSION IN MASSACHUSETTS, 1760-1840, at 7-30 (1979) (discussing the emergence of
the legal profession in Massachusetts and the trained lawyers' effort to elevate their status
by organizing bar associations and devising regular programs of legal study in colonial
America). The young John Adams, who saw himself as a model of the well-trained
professional, made one of his first projects, upon setting up practice in Braintree,
Massachusetts, an attack on the pettifoggers in the vicinity who lacked the qualifications
to properly practice. See 1 DIARY AND AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF JOHN ADAMS 44-45, 64-65
(L.H. Butterfield ed., 1964) [hereinafter AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF JOHN ADAMS]. One of these
"pretenders," however, did best Adams in his first case. See infra note 32 and
accompanying text. For an interesting discussion of Adams's view of the virtues of elitism,
see Daniel R. Coquillette, Justinian in Braintree: John Adams, Civilian Learning and Legal
Elitism, in LAW IN COLONIAL MASSACHUsErrS, 1630-1800, at 359, 376-81 (Daniel R.
Coquillette et al. eds., 1984).
28. SAMUEL TYLER, MEMOIR OF ROGER BROOKE TANEY 61 (photo. reprint 1970)
(1872).
29. See Joseph H. Smith, New Light on the Dochne of Judicial Precedent in Early
America, 1607-1776, in LEGAL THOUGHT IN THE UNITED STATES UNDER CONTEMPORARY
PRESSURES 9 (John N. Hazard & Wencelas J. Wagner eds., 1970) (finding a vigorous
doctrine of precedent in colonial America and the widespread use of English cases to
resolve colonial questions, at least when no colonial statutes could be found on point).
30. See AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF JOHN ADAMS, supra note 27, at 44-45.
31. Jeremiah Gridley was one of the leading lawyers in Boston at this time. See id.
at 45 n.4.
32. L. Kinvin Wroth & Hiller B. Zobel, Editorial Note on the Case of Field v.
[Vol. 36
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at hand. His resolution in the face of this disaster illustrates the amount of
effort needed to master the system: "Let me never undertake to draw a
Writt, without sufficient Time to examine, and digest in my mind all the
Doubts, Queries, Objections that may arise." 33
Students in the early national period had an easier time than the young
Adams had resolving doubts, queries, and objections about the proper
form of pleadings. Nisi prius books that organized legal principles under
procedural headings became available, as did printed books of precedents
(model pleadings).' Not only did such works provide models for the
practice of law, they also were important pedagogical tools, providing an
organizing scheme for the student confronted with the complexities of Sir
Edward Coke and the English abridgments that were forced to serve in
the absence of extensive American reports.' Daniel Webster's account
Lambert, in THE EARLIEST DIARY OF JOHN ADAMS 82, 86-89 (L.H. Butterfield ed., 1966).
33. AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF JOHN ADAMS, supra note 27, at 65. For a discussion of Field
v. Lambert and the difficulties with the pleading, see id. at 48-50, and Wroth & Zobel,
supra note 32, at 82-89. Adams's civilian learning was not without practical use. See
Coquillette, supra note 27, at 382-95.
34. See DAVID HOFFMAN, A COURSE OF LEGAL STUDY 372-73 (Philadelphia,
Thomas, Cowperthwait 1846). Hoffman's definition of the nisi prius treatise indicates its
usefulness to the student:
It deals principally with the forms of actions,--the pleadings and evidence
appropriate to each,--he modes of trial,---the proceedings of practice,--and
finally, with every manner relating to the trial of issues of fact and of law, and
the removal of points to the superior courts, for final adjudication.
Id. at 372. Hoffman lists seven examples of the genre that were "wholly unknown to the
bibliotheca legum, prior to the year 1760." Id. at 372-73.
35. Sir Edward Coke was a seventeenth-centuy English jurist and legal theorist who
has been referred to as the oracle of the common law. See FRANCIS R. AUMANN, THE
CHANGING AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM 63 (1940). Coke wrote extensively on the common
law and some of his best-known works include his Reports (of cases) and the Institutes. See
STEPHEN B. PRESSER & JAMIL S. ZAINALDIN, LAW AND AMERICAN HISTORY: CASES AND
MATERIALS 10 n.1 (1980).
36. See DANIEL WEBSTER, Account and Report, in 1 THE PAPERS OF DANIEL
WEBSTER 6 (Alfred S. Konefsky & Andrew J. King ds., 1982). Apparently these aids had
not reached Maryland in 1796, the year the young Roger Brooke Taney began to read law
in the office of Jeremiah Townley Chase, one of the judges of the Maryland General Court.
In his memoir, Taney stated his belief that studying in the office of a judge rather than of
a practicing lawyer was on the whole disadvantageous principally because he never was
required to draw pleadings and had to take all his knowledge of them from books which
themselves were not very useful:
The want of this practical knowledge and experience was a serious inconvenience
to me. And for some time after I commenced practice, I did not venture to draw
the most ordinary form of a declaration or plea without a precedent before me;
and if the cause of action required a declaration varying in any degree from the
1991]
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of his discovery of one of the most popular nisi prius volumes represents
the probable experience of many students:
I read Coke['s] Littleton[3 ] through, without understanding a
quarter of it. Happening to take up Espinasse's Law of Nisi
Prius,[] I found I could understand it, & arguing that the object
of reading was to understand what was written, I laid down the
venerable Coke et alios similes reverendos,[3 ] & kept company
for a time with Mr. Espinasse, & other [of] the most plain, easy
& intelligible writers. A boy of twenty, with no previous
knowledge on such subjects, cannot understand Coke. It is folly
to set him upon such an author. There are propositions in Coke,
so abstract, & distinctions so nice, & doctrines embracing so
many conditions, & qualifications, that it requires an effort, not
only of a mature mind, but of a mind both strong and mature to
understand him. Why disgust & discourage a boy, by telling him
that he must break into his profession, thro [sic] such a wall as
this? I really often despaired. ... Mr. Espinasse, however,
helped me out of this, in the way I have mentioned; & I have
always felt greatly obliged to him.
United States Supreme Court Justice Joseph Story, too, was driven to
distraction by the
dry and technical principles, the dark and mysterious elements of
the feudal system, the subtle refinements and intricacies of the
middle ages of the Common Law, and the repulsive and almost
ordinary money counts, or the defence required a special plea, I found it
necessary to examine the principles of pleading which applied to it, and
endeavored to find a precedent for a case of precisely that character, nor was it
so easy, in that day, for an inexperienced young lawyer to satisfy himself upon
a question of special pleading. Chitty had not made his appearance, and you
were obliged to look for the rule in Comyn's Digest, or Bacon's Abridgment,
or Viner's Abridgment, and the cases to which they referred ....
TYLER, supra note 28, at 60-61.
37. Webster is referring to Coke's famous treatise on English law, EDWARD COKE,
THE FIRST PART OF THE INsTUTMs OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND (photo. reprint 1979)
(1628).
38. Isaac Espinasse published a series of digests on the legal rules for trials at nisi
prius, first printed in 1790.
39. And other similarly revered [writers].
40. WEwsTER, supra note 36, at 6-7.
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unintelligible forms of processes and pleadings, for the most part
wrapped up in black-letter, or in dusty folios. 41
The obscurities of Coke on Littleton made him weep.4 2 He found
pleading, however, to be refreshing, and having once mastered it, "it
became for several years afterward my favorite pursuit."'
The fruit of this enthusiasm was Story's first published work, A
Selection of Pleadings in Civil Actions, published in January 1805." The
book was no mere compilation, but the result of diligent search in the
English books and the records of the Massachusetts courts, and
examination of the manuscript collections of some of the leading members
of the Massachusetts bar. The author provided numerous citations to
authorities and principles illuminating use of a particular form, thereby,
he hoped, increasing the book's usefulness to students. Apparently the
work fulfilled its purpose, for it remained a prime reference at least until
the time of Story's death forty years later.'
More telling evidence of its influence comes from a remarkably
hostile review that appeared in a Boston magazine soon after the book's
publication.47 An anonymous reviewer derided the book as a mere report
of knowledge that any student who has read Blackstone should be
presumed to possess." The only effect of the book would be pernicious,
convincing the uneducated that, having read it, they knew more than they
truly did.49
41. THE MISCELLANEOUS WTrINGS OF JOSEPH STORY 19 (William W. Story ed.,
Boston, Little & Brown 1852).
42. Id. at 20.
43. Id. For a defense of the importance of studying Coke, see HOFFMAN, supra note
34, at 215-31.
44. JOSEPH STORY, A SELECTION OF PLEADINGS IN CIvIL ACTIONS, SUBSEQUENT TO
THE DECLARATION, WITH OCCASIONAL ANNOTATIONS ON THE LAW OF PLEADING (R.H.
Helmholz & Bernard D. Reams eds., 1980) (1805).
45. See id. at iv.
46. 1 WILLIAM W. STORY, LIFE AND LETTERS OF JOSEPH STORY 112 (Boston, Little
& Brown 1851).
47. See Review of Story's Pleadings, 2 MONTHLY ANTHOLOGY & BOSTON REV. 484
(1805), quoted in JAMES MCCLELAN, JOSEPH STORY AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION:
A STUDY IN POLITICAL AND LEGAL THOUGHT 23-26 (1971). It was suggested that a
motive for such a caustic review was an awareness of the impact that simplifying the
pleadings would have on the legal profession, as well as a desire to forestall the inevitable
democratization of the profession that would result. See MCCLELLAN, supra, at 24.
48. See MCCLELLAN, supra note 47, at 23-26.
49. See id. at 24.
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The appetite for works such as Story's, however, was undiminished
by such slights. Joseph Chitty's famous treatise on pleading and its
accompanying collection of model forms went through eight American
editions from 1809 to 1840.' James Gould's treatise on pleading, taken
from his lectures at the law school in Litchfield, Connecticut, was
published in 1832, again in 1836, and was republished several times after
his death in 1838. 51 This literary activity was accompanied by a chorus
of praise from the articulate in the profession, especially those involved
in legal education. They lauded the "science" of pleading and the structure
provided by the forms of action as the key to understanding the common
law, as an example of the highest attainments of logic, and even as
something of aesthetic appeal.52
United States Supreme Court Justice James Wilson53 told his auditors
in Philadelphia that the existence of abuses of the system of pleading,
which caused delay and frustrated justice, did not lessen the glories of the
subject:
The history of a suit at law, from its commencement, through
all the different steps of its progress, to its conclusion, presents
an object very interesting to a mind sensible to the beauty of strict
and accurate arrangement. The dispositions of the drama are not
made with more exactness and art. Everything is done by the
proper persons, at the proper time, in the proper place, in the
proper order, and in the proper form.'
For Gould, whose law teaching had more practical effect than
Wilson's, pleading was not only a thing of great logical beauty, it was also
"the most important single title in the law" because it summed up in itself
all of the common law.-'
50. See Jenni Parrish, Law Books and Legal Publishing in America, 1760-1840, 72
LAw LIER. J. 385, 385-86 (1979).
51. See JAMES GOULD, A TREATISE ON THE PRINCIPLES OF PLEADING IN CIVIL
ACTIONS at xi (Franklin F. Heard ed., 5th ed. 1887) (Albany, William Gould, Jr., & Co.
1832); Parrish, supra note 50, at 401.
52. See GOULD, supra note 51, at xii.
53. James Wilson was one of the original U.S. Supreme Court Justices, and was also
a signer of both the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution. See JAMES WILSON,
Of the Study of Law in the United States, in 1 THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 2, 2-19
(Robert G. McCloskey ed., 1967).
54. Id. at 95-96.
55. GOULD, supra note 51, at xii.
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This pre-eminence it owes, not solely to the intrinsic value of its
own exact and logical principles, but also, and in no small
degree, to the fact, that the principles of pleading are necessarily
and closely interwoven, both in theory and practice, with those of
every other title of the law. I say, "necessarily" interwoven,
because even the most simple of judicial remedies, which the law
affords, and without which it would be, practically, a dead letter,
cannot be obtained, without the aid of pleading.-
In the best scientific fashion, Gould claimed to present pleading not as "a
compilation of positive rules; but as a system of consistent and rational
principles. ,5
David Hoffman told the readers of his course of legal study much the
same thing, quoting the praise offered by leading members of the English
bar. He summed it up quite well: "[The system of pleading is] a most
ingenious, beautiful and wonderful system;-a system entitled, when well
comprehended, honestly practiced, and reduced to its real elements, to
rank with the sciences most worthy of being studied.""
In 1832, Daniel Mayes treated his entering law class at the University
of Transylvania in Kentucky to a demonstration of the rigorously logical
nature of pleading and its perfect fitness to the task of isolating a single
issue for decision.Y Three years later, Benjamin Butler wrote a plan for
legal instruction by the University of the City of New York, at the request
of the trustees of the University.' He suggested that students first be
instructed in the practicalities of procedure rather than in the mysteries of
principles."A Butler believed that a thorough proficiency in the
adjectivez law was the key to understanding substantive rules.'
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. HOFFMAN, supra note 34, at 352.
59. See Daniel Mayes, An Address to the Students of Law in Transylvania University
Delivered at the Beginning of the Session for 1835, at 14-17 (1835) (transcript available
in Columbia Law School Library).
60. At the time of this request, Butler was Attorney General of the United States. He
later founded the law school at New York University. See Julius J. Marke, Introduction to
BENjAMIN F. BUTLER, PLAN FOR THE ORGANIZATION OF A LAW FACULTY, IN THE
UNVRSrrY OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK at v, viii (photo. reprint 1956) (1835). The
current New York University was known as the University of the City of New York at that
time. Id. at v.
61. See id. at 17-18.
62. See id. at x.
63. See id. at 17-18.
1991]
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Our forms of proceeding, though generally prolix, and often
encumbered by needless technicalities, are yet intimately
connected with the principles of the Law. And as a general rule,
he who best understands the nature and design of the instruments
which the Law employs, will not only be most expert in the
business of his profession, but be best qualified to look above the
mere form, and to lay hold of and appropriate to their true uses,
the higher parts of his profession."
With the establishment of the school in the following year, David Graham
was appointed Professor of Practice. In his inaugural address, he too
stated that the rules of procedure were intimately connected with the
substantive rules of law.' He found that the principles of pleading
themselves, like those substantive principles, were based "not upon
abstract or arbitrary regulations, but upon the unalterable foundations of
inductive philosophy." 6
Other educators gave pleading an honored position in their educational
plans. James Gould's emphasis on the subject at Litchfield has already
been noted.67 In the 1820s, Virginia was the site of an even more
thoroughly practical experiment in training young men for the law.
Chancellor Creed Taylor' began a law school in his home at Needham
in 1821.1 His method of instruction centered not around lectures but
rather around a moot court in which all students would "practice" and
receive intensive training in drafting papers that the instructor would then
review.' Taylor planned to publish the records of these sessions in
journal form. In the preface to the first volume he stated his goal:
Should I live to complete four volumes of the journal of the law-
school of from three hundred to three hundred and fifty pages
each, there will not be an order in the common course of
64. Id. at 18.
65. See David Graham, Jr., The Practice of the Law, As Illustrated in the Study of
Pleading and Practice, in AN INAUGURAL ADDRESS DEUVERED BY THE PROFESSORS OF
LAW IN THE UNIVERSrrY OF THE CITY OF NEW-YORK AT THE OPENING OF THE LAW
SCHOOL OF THAT INSTnTUON 51, 64 (New York, E.B. Clayton 1838).
66. Id.
67. See supra notes 55-57 and accompanying text.
68. Prior to his appointment as Chancellor of the Virginia High Court of Chancery in
1806, Taylor served in the House of Delegates in 1788 and in the Virginia Senate from
1798 to 1805. W. HAMILTON BRYSON, LEGAL EDUCATION IN VIRGINIA 1779-1979: A
BIOGRAPHICAL APPROACH 589 (1982).
69. Id. at 30.
70. Id. at 31.
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proceedings, which a court can be called upon to make, but a
precedent of it will be found in one of the volumes: and so, as
to all the usual pleadings in the courts of law or equity: for there
will not be in either a useful precedent omitted."
Taylor advised his students not to ignore the science of the law-the
study of "the law of nature and nations: civil law: admiralty law:
mercantile law:" as well as criminal law and reports of the American and
English courts.72 He applauded the efforts "to bring to the noble
profession of the law to something like a correct system of pleading, and
that very meritorious and distinguished class of gentlemen, the clerks of
our courts, to a uniform method of entry, and of making out complete
records."' Producing competent working men of the profession,
however, was challenge enough for Chancellor Taylor.
Some hint of how instruction in law through the study of pleading
operated is given by the suggestions for legal study with which William
Wirt favored his young kinsman Francis Gilmer in a letter. Wirt instructed
Gilmer to work his way through the headings in Bacon's Abridgment,
paying attention first to the related pleadings.74
For example, the first head in Bacon is "abatement." .... The
course which we propose is, first, to see what Blackstone says on
that subject throughout, which you will easily do by the aid of his
index. Consult Tucker's Blackstone,7 5] with the editor's notes,
to see the changes superinduced by our state law. You will thus
have gotten the chart of the coast, at least in outline, and know
were [sic] you are; next Chitty,-in his first volume you will see
his learning on the pleas of abatement. In his second, you will see
the forms of the plea itself, which you must be able to draw
before you lay him down.76
71. 1 CREED TAYLOR, JOURNAL OF THE LAW-SCHOOL at vii (Richmond, Cochran
1822). Although Taylor lived until 1836, no further volumes of the Journal were
published. For further information on the school and Taylor, see BRYSON, supra note 68,
at 29-33, 589-95.
72. TAYLOR, supra note 71, at 12.
73. Id. at vii.
74. See 1 JOHN P. KENNEDY, MEMOIRS OF THE LIFE OF WILuAM WIRT 362-63
(photo. reprint 1973) (1849). Wirt is referring to Matthew Bacon's New Abridgment of the
Laws ofEngland, first published in 1730.
75. St. George Tucker edited the first American edition of Blackstone's Commentaries
in 1803.
76. KENNEDY, supra note 74, at 362.
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Only then should the student read the cases referred to by Bacon, followed
by subsequent English and leading American cases.' Pleading came first;
it provided the structure.
It is not surprising to find judicial approval of the science of pleading.
As Chief Justice of the New York Supreme Court of Judicature, James
Kent ventilated the commonplace in his opinion in Bayard v. Malcolm,7"
in 1806:
General rules will sometimes appear harsh and rigorous, in their
application to particular cases; but I entertain a decided opinion
that the established principles of pleading, which compose what
is called its science, are rational, concise, luminous, and
admirably adapted to the investigation of truth, and ought,
consequentZ, to be very cautiously touched by the hand of
innovation.
The similarity between Kent's comments and the praise heaped on the
system by theorists and teachers is evident. Many such statements by other
judges could, no doubt, be produced. One comment on the subject is
clearly worth noting, however, because of its source. Fifty years after
Kent's opinion in Bayard, Justice Robert C. Grier of the United States
Supreme Court produced a remarkable defense of the traditional system
of pleading:
This system, matured by the wisdom of the ages, founded on
principles of truth and sound reason, has been ruthlessly abolished
in many of our States, who have rashly substituted in its place the
suggestions of sciolists, who invent new codes and systems of
pleading to order. But this attempt to abolish all species, and
establish a single genus, is found to be beyond the power of
legislative omnipotence. They cannot compel the human mind not
to distinguish between things that differ. The distinction between
the different forms of actions for different wrongs, requiring
different remedies, lies in the nature of things; it is absolutely
inseparable from the correct administration of justice in common-
law courts. °
77. Id.
78. 1 Johns. 453 (1806).
79. Id. at470-71.
80. McFaul v. Ramsey, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 523, 525 (1857).
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Grier's outcry was provoked by the growing movement to abolish
common law pleading and the accompanying forms of action in favor of
codes of pleading, many modeled on the first code, that of New York,
adopted in 1848.81 The Justice's assertion that the forms of action and the
pleadings connected with them were rooted in the nature of things, and
beyond legislative alteration, is striking evidence of the extent to which
common law pleading penetrated the antebellum legal mind and reinforced
its understanding of the law itself.'
Despite the enormous investment, both practical and emotional, in the
existing system of procedure, it did not rule unchallenged. In
Massachusetts, a gradual process of erosion of formality paved the way
for statutory change in 1836 and 185 1.' Overt calls for reform could be
found in the pages of that organ of scientific legalism, the American
Jurist." In the latter 1840s, truly revolutionary change occurred.
81. The New York Code of Civil Procedure is discussed in detail, infra notes 85-108
and accompanying text.
82. At the conclusion of his article on the changes in procedure in debt collection cases
in Connecticut, Bruce Mann suggests a good reason for the attachment on the part of
lawyers to the forms of law: "Lawyers function best when they have a scheme of
conceptual pigeonholes to classify the situations they encounter. While not a return to the
terrible rigor of form pleading, increased technicality of pleading represented, from a
lawyer's perspective, an internal simplification that allowed them to categorize things more
precisely." Mann, supra note 14, at 213. William Nelson argues that although the
weaknesses of the system were evident early, it persisted because "it provided lawyers with
a conceptual framework for analyzing an otherwise amorphous body of legal rules."
NELSON, supra note 20, at 87.
For other U.S. Supreme Court cases evidencing impatience with attempts to reform
common law procedure, see FarnLi v. Tesson, 66 U.S. (1 Black) 309 (1861); Green v.
Custard, 64 U.S. (23 How.) 484 (1859); Bennet v. Butterworth, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 669
(1850); Randon v. Toby, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 493 (1850).
The Supreme Court dealt with these reformed state procedures because of the diversity
jurisdiction of the federal courts. Cases that would otherwise be litigated in the state courts
can be brought in federal court if the parties are citizens of different states (and if certain
other requirements are met). Until the passage of the Act of June 1, 1872, ch. 255, § 5,
17 Stat. 196 (the Conformity Act), which required procedure in diversity cases brought on
the law side of the federal courts to conform "as near as may be" to the state procedure
that would have governed had the case been brought in state court, the choice of procedure
was governed by the Process Acts of 1789, ch. 21, § 2, 1 Stat. 93; of 1792, ch. 36, § 2,
1 Stat. 276; and of 1828, ch. 68, § 1, 4 Stat. 278. See ROBERT W. MILIAR, CIVIL
PROCEDURE OF THE TRIAL COURT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 57-60 (1952). Generally
speaking, these Acts required that the federal court apply the state procedure that obtained
at the time the Process Act became applicable to the state. The effect was to "freeze" state
procedure as of that date. See Charles E. Clark & James W. Moore, A New Federal Cvil
Procedure, I. he Background, 44 YALE L.J. 387, 400-01 (1937).
83. See NELSON, supra note 20, at 69-88.
84. See, e.g., Art. 1I-Codification, and Reform of the Law--No. 1, 14 AM. JURIST
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In 1845, the year Joseph Story died, voters in the State of New York
approved the calling of that state's third constitutional convention.' The
document that emerged from the deliberations was approved by voters on
November 3, 1846, by a better than two-to-one margin." The new
constitution drastically reorganized the judicial system of the state.
Separate equity courts were abolished and jurisdiction in both law and
equity was vested in a single supreme court.87 The Court for the
Correction of Errors, composed of the judges of the old state supreme
court, the Chancellor, and the Senate of the state, was abolished. In its
place the constitution created a new court of appeals.88 All judicial
offices became elective. 9 Finally, the constitution of 1846 contained a
provision that had a great impact on what went on before the popularly
elected judges in the newly reorganized courts.' The legislature was
required to appoint three commissioners to simplify the law of pleading
and procedure.9'
Commissioners were duly appointed in April of 1847, and a new Code
of Procedure was enacted on April 12, 1848, which became effective on
July 1' The code was re-enacted on April 11, 1849, with
amendments. 3  Amended again in 1851 4  and 1852, 95 the Code
280, 281 (1835) (stating that "evil results from the necessity of conforming to an uncertain
rule, and from the delay and expense of ascertaining that law which ought to have been his
guide").
85. See Robert L. Fowler, Constitutional and Related Aspects from 1801 to the
Constitution of 1894, in 1 HISTORY OF THE BENCH AND BAR OF NEW YORK 123, 155
(David McAdam et al. eds., New York, N.Y. Hist. Co. 1897).
86. Id. at 158.
87. FRANCIS BERGAN, THE HISTORY OF THE NEW YORK COURT OF APPEAis, 1847-
1932, at 19 (1985).
88. Id.
89. Id. at 35.
90. See N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 24 (1846), reprinted in 1847 N.Y. Laws 401.
91. See An Act for the Appointment of Commissioners, as Required by the
Seventeenth Section, of Article First, and the Twenty-Fourth Section, of Article Sixth, of
the Constitution, ch. 59, § 8, 1847 N.Y. Laws 67; see also Alison Reppy, The Field
Codification Concept, in DAVID DUDLEY FIELD: CENTENARY ESSAYS 17, 32 (Alison Reppy
ed., 1949).
92. See An Act to Simplify and Abridge the Practice, Pleadings and Proceedings of
the Courts of this State, ch. 379, § 391, 1848 N.Y. Laws 497 [hereinafter 1848 Code of
Procedure]; see also Reppy, supra note 91, at 34 (discussing the adoption of this Act).
93. See An Act to Amend the Act Entitled "An Act to Simplify and Abridge the
Practice, Pleadings and Proceedings of the Courts of this State," ch. 438, 1849 N.Y. Laws
613 [hereinafter 1849 Code of Procedure]; see also Reppy, supra note 91, at 34 (discussing
the adoption of this Act).
94. See An Act to Amend the Code of Procedure, ch. 479, 1851 N.Y. Laws 876.
[V/ol. 36
1991] THE FIELD CODE
governed the practice of the New York courts until it was repealed in
1877 . 6
Both the unification of law and equity in the 1846 constitution and the
procedural Code itself were part of a broad and varied movement for legal
reform in the decades preceding the Civil War. Although the name
"codification movement" is often used as an all-purpose term in
discussions of legal reform in this period, its currency should not be
allowed to suggest the existence of a unified and coherent "movement."
Codification meant different things to those who identified themselves as
its proponents. Some advocates were determined enemies of the common
law who saw in its English roots its independence of the legislature and
the power it gave to judges, something contrary to everything the
Revolution was believed to have accomplished.' For others, including
Joseph Story, codification meant the reduction to statutory form of those
parts of the common law that were certain enough to be cogently and
clearly stated.' The goals of these diverse advocates ranged from the
creation of several volumes of revised statutes, to the abolition of the
common law and the reduction of all law to statutes brief enough to be
contained in a book so small as to allow every citizen to carry it about,
phrased in language so simple as to lead to the abolition of the legal
profession.'
95. See An Act to Amend Certain Sections of the Code of Procedure, ch. 392, 1852
N.Y. Laws 651.
96. Reppy, supra note 91, at 34-35.
97. Id. at 19-21.
98. See supra notes 41-52 and accompanying text.
99. See CHARLEs M. CooK, THE AMERICAN CODIFICATION MOVEMENT: A STUDY
OF ANTEBMIbUM LEGAL REFORM 5, 23-29, 158-67 (1981). So brief a summary, of course,
belies the complexity of the codification movement. Indeed, in some ways it is misleading
to speak of a movement; so involved with other questions was the idea of reducing all or
some law to statutes. In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, hostility to the
common law was part of a negative attitude toward England and all things English that was
associated with the emerging Republican party. This split between Francophiles and
Anglophiles carried into the nineteenth century when the Code Napoleon became the model
for at least some advocates of codification.
The issue is also part of that gradual democratization of politics beginning in the
1820s, which was expressed in the growth of political parties, a spate of constitution
making, and such particular reforms as the election of judges. Finally, reorganization of
the law was an important part of more local issues. In New York, for instance, any attempt
to systematize the law of land tenures and any suggestion to change court organization
would have to take account of the furious battles over rural tenancy in the Hudson valley.
The discussion here concentrates on what the procedural changes made by the Field Code
meant for those who had to work with them rather than with the battle to enact and
preserve them. To that extent, the following discussion treats the changes made as part of
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The 1848 Code of Procedure, usually called the Field Code after its
chief proponent, David Dudley Field, cannot be characterized simply as
conservative or radical reform." The changes it wrought were changes
in how lawyers and judges conducted the business of the courts. It was not
the sort of reform designed to dramatically reduce to laymen's terms the
administration of justice. Yet, within the professional world of judges and
lawyers it did bring about a far reaching, if gradual, transformation in
how some New York legal professionals thought about law. Alterations in
the language used to bring complaints before the courts eventually led to
new ways of understanding the law itself. Christopher Langdell grew to
professional maturity in this new world. His thought reflects it, and his
work on contracts shows an attempt to understand a field of law in terms
made useful by the transformation of New York jurisprudence in the
decades before the Civil War.10'
It is an understatement to call David Dudley Field the chief proponent
of the procedural Code that came to bear his name. Starting in the 1830s,
Field was a persistent advocate of legal reform."°2 He did not rest with
the passage of the Code of Procedure. Until his death, in 1894, Field
remained perhaps the most prominent advocate of codification of law in
the American legal profession, both procedural and substantive, domestic
and international.1's He was also one of the most prominent practitioners
in the city of New York, famous or notorious, depending on the
observer's point of view, for representing some of the most flamboyant
characters of the age, including Jay Gould1" and Boss Tweed. 5 He
a legal world that seems to have no connection to what goes on outside the courtroom-or,
for that matter, outside judges' heads. Clearly, it is only part of the story, but, just as
clearly, it is a part worth telling.
100. For more background regarding the Field Code, see Stephen N. Subrin, David
Dudley Field and the Field Code: An Historical Analysis of an Earlier Procedural Vision,
6 LAW & HIST. REV. 311, 313-327 (1988).
101. See GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF A CONTRACT 35-44 (1974) (discussing
Langdell's view of using objective tests in ascertaining a "meeting of the minds" in contract
formation cases); Grey, supra note 12, at 24-32 (outlining Langdell's analysis of the
consider'ation doctrine and other principles of contract law). Langdell published his now-
famous book, A Selection of Cases on the Law of Contracts, in 1871.
102. See Reppy, supra note 91, at 31.
103. See id. at 17-18.
104. Jay Gould was a nineteenth-century industrialist who at one time controlled half
the railroad systems in the Southwest, New York City's elevated rail'lines, and the Western
Union Telegraph Co. In 1869, Gould's scheming to corner the gold market caused the
"Black Friday" panic. Gould eventually lost control of his railroad monopoly through
questionable stock manipulations in 1872. See GUSTAVUS MYERS, THE HISTORY OF
TAMMANY HALL 266-67 (1901).
105. William Marcy Tweed was a nineteenth-century American politician and leader
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was nothing if not controversial and persistent. Field was also, at least in
his first great battle, successful. He began that battle in the late 1830s. His
arguments for the changes adopted in the 1846 constitution and the Code
of Procedure that followed were straightforward. The separation of legal
and equitable jurisdiction in two different courts and the continued use of
traditional common law and equitable procedures in those courts was
wasteful. 1"s He sounded what was a standard call of reformers in the
nineteenth century common law world-a dispute that can be settled in the
courts should be settled in one action, initiated by pleadings that told as
simply as possible what happened, brought before a single court capable
of giving all the relief appropriate."° The triumph of this sort of reform
in the Anglo-American legal world has become so complete by the late
twentieth century that it is difficult to appreciate the impact of what Field
proposed and the vigor with which it was opposed."° Insight into both
can be gained by a brief examination of a case Field argued soon after the
enactment of the new Code.
Alger v. Scoville'°9 was argued before the General Term of the New
York Supreme Court in 1851. Alger was a creditor of the Dutchess
County Iron Company, which had gone into bankruptcy and had assigned
its property to Daniel S. Clapp as trustee for the payment of the
company's debts."1  Scoville had guaranteed a portion of that debt."'
Clapp and Scoville were defendants, as were the stockholders of the
defunct company.12 Since the defendants were entitled to whatever was
left after the company's debts were paid, their interests were adverse to
Alger's claim. Alger requested the payment of his debt (a demand based
on his contract with the company and Scoville), the removal of Clapp, and
of New York's notorious Tammany Hall political machine. As "Boss Tweed," he
controlled nominations and patronage in New York City politics. Tweed and his cronies,
including Jay Gould, defrauded New York City of at least thirty million dollars in kickback
schemes. Eventually, Tweed was removed from power and died in prison. See WARREN
Moscow, THE LAST OF THE BIG-TDME BossEs 12-13 (1971).
106. See Reppy, supra note 91, at 31-32.
107. See id. at 30-31.
108. For a telling of the story through the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure that criticizes some of the ways in which these aims have been realized, see
Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of Cvil
Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909, 914-1002 (1987).
109. 6 How. Pr. 131 (1851).
110. Id. at 132-33.
111. Id. at 136.
112. Id. at 132.
19911
NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW
the appointment of a receiver to manage the remaining assets of the
company 11
3
To Field, this trial must have seemed to showcase the superiority of
the new Code. First, he was able to take advantage of the Code's liberal
provisions for the joinder of actions."1 4 Traditional common law
procedure had long forbidden, at least in theory, the joining in one suit of
different causes of action. 5 The Code abolished the old forms of action
in favor of a single "civil action."" 6 Section 167 allowed the joinder
in one suit of all causes of action falling within one of seven broad
categories." 7 In Field's view, Alger had but one cause of action, the
debt owed him by the company, and everything relating to that debt could
and must be resolved in this one proceeding."' Second, under the old
procedure, complex rules limited the joinder of parties-the persons who
could be brought into a single suit and thus be bound by the determination
therein." 9 The Code allowed the joining of everyone without whom the
113. Id. at 137-38.
114. See Mitchell G. Williams, Pleading Reform in ineteenth Century America: The
Joinder of Actions at Common Law and Under the Code, 6 J. LEGAL HIST. 299, 313
(1985).
115. For a thorough discussion of the nineteenth-century practice of joinder and the
theory of joinder of actions in common law procedure, see id. at 299-311.
116. See 1848 Code of Procedure § 118, 1848 N.Y. Laws at 521. In the 1849
enactment, this provision became § 140, reading in part: "All forms of pleading heretofore
existing, inconsistent with the provisions of this act, are abolished .... " 1849 Code of
Procedure § 140, 1849 N.Y. Laws at 645.
117. 1849 Code of Procedure § 167, 1849 N.Y. Laws at 649, stated:
The plaintiff may unite several causes of action in the same complaint, where
they all arise out of,
1. Contract, express or implied; or,
2. Injuries with or without force, to the person; or,
3. Injuries with or without force, to property; or,
4. Injuries to character, or,
5. Claims to recover real property, with or without damages, for with-
holding thereof, and the rent and profits of the same; or,
6. Claims to recover personal property, with or without damages, for the
withholding thereof; or,
7. Claims against a trustee by virtue of a contract or by operation of law.
But the causes of action, so united, must all belong to one only of these classes,
and must affect all the parties to the action, and not require different places of
trial, and must be separately stated.
Id. For a discussion of the changes in the Field Code's provisions on joinder of actions, see
Williams, supra note 114, at 313-17.
118. See Alger, 6 How. Pr. at 137.
119. See, e.g., 1 JOsEPH CHrM, TREATISE ON THE PARTIES TO ACTIONS, THE FORMS
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final judgment could not be complete, thus limiting the multiplication of
suits." Alger had sued all those whose economic interest would lead
them to oppose the payment of his debt."' Finally, actions against
trustees were the province of equity. The Code effected the abolition of
the distinction between law and equity in the 1846 constitution by creating
the single civil action.' No longer would a plaintiff in Alger's situation
have to go to two different courts to obtain total relief. 3 Surely this
case presented an excellent illustration of what the new system could
accomplish for the more efficient administration of justice.
Unfortunately, this particular court was not at all convinced. In a
scathing opinion, Justice Seward Barculo evinced total hostility to the
changes brought about by the Code." 4 He analyzed the joinder rules of
section 167 in terms of the abolished forms of action, and severely limited
the possibilities for expeditious disposal of disputes. 1" Barculo supported
his reading of the joinder provisions by noting that on the contract matter
(that is, the existence of the debt and Scoville's guarantee) the parties were
entitled to a jury trial, but the portion of the suit relating to the removal
of Clapp as trustee would be tried by the court. 1" The Code dealt with
just such a situation by allowing the judge to order a jury trial of the
matter otherwise triable to the court."z Barculo interpreted that
provision out of existence and indulged in a belittling attack on the jury
system that Field and his fellow revisers held in high regard.1" Juries
are fit to decide only simple issues.1" Complex matters cannot be
OF ACTIONS, AND ON PLEADING 1-86 (Philadelphia, H.C. Carey & I. Lea ads., 4th Am.
ed. 1825).
120. See 1849 Code of Procedure §§ 117-20, 122, 1849 N.Y. Laws at 639-40.
121. See Alger, 6 How. Pr. at 137-38.
122. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
123. Under this scenario, even if Alger won his action at law with a judgment in his
favor on the debt, Clapp was in control of the remaining assets of the company. If Clapp
was improperly favoring the stockholders over creditors, as Alger claimed he was, Alger's
recovery would be nugatory. Yet action against Clapp would require a separate suit in the
equity court. Under the new system, all causes of action could be addressed at once.
124. See Alger, 6 How. Pr. at 139-44.
125. See id. at 139-42.
126. See id. at 142-43. To this extent, the Code preserved the distinction between law
and equity. Because the constitutional guarantee to trial by jury was created when law and
equity were distinct systems, the question involved in this case has arisen frequently as the
division between law and equity has diminished. See FLEMING JAMES, JR. & GEOFFREY
C. HAZARD, JR., CIVIL PROCEDURE 347-89 (2d ed. 1977).
127. 1849 Code of Procedure § 209, 1849 N.Y. Laws at 536.
128. See Alger, 6 How. Pr. at 139.44; Subrin, supra note 100, at 333-34.
129. Alger, 6 How. Pr. at 142.
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resolved by hoping for total agreement among twelve men.1 Barculo
stated that "[c]ommon sense and the nature of things" tell us that the
question of the fitness of a trustee and his possible removal cannot be tried
to a jury."' He concluded with a criticism of the Code that could only
be construed by Field as a deliberate insult.
It is in truth greatly to be regretted, that those who assumed
the responsibility of devising a remedy for the insufficiencies of
the former system, did not more fully understand and appreciate
the true cause and nature of the evils to be remedied; which arose
mainly from a want of sufficient judicial force to dispose of the
rapidly increasing business of a growing state and commercial
people. But in this age of progress, it not unfrequently happens,
that alteration is mistaken for reformation, and the public, feeling
the necessity of some improvement, is too often contented with
a mere change; not distinguishing, at first, between the benefits
of a solid reform and the crude innovation of conceited
pretension.132
Justice Barculo's treatment of the Code led Field to exclaim that his
own view of the matter was that intended by the legislature." Barculo
replied that the legislature meant exactly what it said and nothing else."
According to Barculo's memorialist, the following colloquy then took
place: "'Well,' replied the counsel, 'I know the codifiers meant so.'
'Ah' responded the judge, 'very likely! They seem to have meant one
thing and said another very often, if your argument is good.'"35 Before
the preparation of the Code of Procedure, Seward Barculo's "predilections
were ultra democratic and progressive."" What was it about the Code
130. Id.
131. Id. at 143.
132. Id. at 144.
133. See John Thompson, Judge Barculo, 20 Barb. app. at 661, 669 (1856).
134. See id.
135. Id. at 669; see also Benjamin D. Silliman, Personal Reminiscences of Sixty Years
at the New York Bar, in HISTORY OF THE BENCH AND BAR OF NEW YORK, supra note 85,
at 226, 239-40. The asperity of this exchange may be characteristic of the times. In 1897,
an aged Benjamin D. Silliman looked back sixty years and found that relationships among
lawyers in antebellum New York had been more formal and less courteous: "Sixty years
ago there was in the bearing of lawyers toward one another, perhaps somewhat more than
at this time, of the punctilio generally imputed to the days of dueling." Id. Two of the
judges then sitting in New York City had been wounded in duels and he could think of at
least three members of the bar who had killed their adversaries. See id. at 240.
136. Thompson, supra note 133, at 668.
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that "had the effect of extirpating from Judge Barculo's mind the last
remains of a radical and reforming spirit"?137 Barculo was a legal
scientist, a skilled jurist who coupled a thorough knowledge of the science
of law with the skills of an accomplished advocate.138 Mastering the
intricacies of practice before the New York courts was no easy task. The
sudden and total change wrought by the Code surely threatened many
accomplished lawyers with professional obsolescence. Barculo may indeed
have believed that the Code was "a reckless effort at change" that left "the
ark of the law, venerable and sacred, profaned by unholy fingers, and its
time-honored principles and practices swept away. " '3
An even more direct expression of professional distress came from
another Justice of the New York Supreme Court, George Gould, who in
1860 produced a new edition of his father James Gould's treatise on
pleading with notes "adapted to the New York Code of Procedure."' °
In his preface, the younger Gould poured forth his frustration with the
democratic process that resulted in the destruction of the old and familiar:
When a profession, distinguished for its learning, is called upon
to surrender its natural prerogative of explaining its own terms,
and understanding its own rules;-and to throw the accumulated
treasures of its knowledge,-the lore of centuries,-into the
crucible of a popular assembly; there to be reduced, and
adulterated, till there should come forth a compound intended to
make "every man his own" lawyer; there cannot be expected to
result any system:-The intention of the whole undertaking is to
break down, not build up. 41
From a century's perspective, it is tempting to see in such language the
real fear of loss, of both economic advantage and social status.
Whatever their material motives may have been, Barculo and other
judges couched their opposition to the Code in purely intellectual terms.
Some of the criticism clearly recognized that the forms of action had
provided the essential framework for understanding the common law. In
137. Id.; see also DONALD B. COLE, MARTIN VAN BuREN AND THE AMERICAN
PoLiTcAL SYSTEM 408-10 (1984). Barculo was first appointed to judicial office in 1845,
by Governor Silas Wright, under the constitution of 1822. Wright was considered a radical
in his day, although he was not sympathetic to the anti-renters. In the same year that he
appointed Bareulo to the Dutchess County court, he declared Delaware County to be in a
state of rebellion and called out troops to quell the anti-rent disturbances. See id.
138. Thompson, supra note 133, at 668.
139. Id.
140. GOULD, supra note 51, at vii-ix.
141. Id. at viii.
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an 1851 opinion, Justice Samuel Selden of the New York Supreme Court
neatly linked the Baconian nature" of legal science, the forms of
action, traditional pleading, and the fear of obsolescence:
Classification, arrangement, is a vital principle in every
science; and especially in that of the law, which consists of such
a multitude of abstract rules, is it indispensable to its clear
comprehension and just application. That important branch of the
common law which relates to civil remedies, has from the origin
of the science been arranged under heads corresponding with the
divisions of actions. Under this arrangement, books have been
written, indexes and digests compiled, and the legal knowledge
of every lawyer is stored in his memory in the same order. He
can not search for a principle either in his books, or in his own
mind, without having this division in view."
In fact, so necessary to comprehension were the old procedures that
some judges found it beyond the power of the legislature to change them.
In 1850, Justice John W. Edmonds of the New York Supreme Court
stoutly asserted that the "principles of pleading are left untouched" by the
Code and insisted on testing the sufficiency of a complaint by rules that
were used under the traditional system.'" Justice Barculo took an
extreme rhetorical position, maintaining that "[elvery person who has
studied and understands the law as a science, knows, that there is
substance in the distinction between actions," and accused the Code of
"meddling with a subject not understood."" Therefore, it "has come
into collision with a 'higher law,'-the law of nature-which it cannot
overcome."146
Although other judges, perfectly willing to accept the possibility of a
totally new system, took a far more sympathetic view of the changes
wrought by the Code," 7 opposition triumphed at the highest levels. In
142. Sir Francis Bacon, English philosopher and statesman, proposed that inductive
logic is the logic of scientific discovery. Natural philosophy--the Baconian nature-is the
observation of particular events from which principles and laws are induced. See LaPiana,
supra note 13, at 774-78.
143. Rochester City Bank v. Suydom, 5 How. Pr. 216, 218 (1851).
144. Dullner v. Gibson, 3 Code Rep. 153, 154 (1850).
145. Leroy v. Marshall, 8 How. Pr. 373, 376 (1853).
146. Id.; see also Wooden v. Waffle, 6 How. Pr. 145, 150 (1851) (stating, with
regard to the system of common law pleading, that "[n]ature had made some laws, and
these it is difficult to repeal").
147. See, e.g., Getty v. Hudson River R.R., 6 How. Pr. 269 (1851) (deciding that
both equitable and legal relief may be prayed for in the same complaint); Williams v.
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1860, Justice Selden wrote an opinion for the New York Court of Appeals
in which he maintained that "there are intrinsic differences between
[actions] which no law can abolish. " "'s George van Santvoord, the
author of a leading treatise on New York code pleading, conceded that the
principles behind the old forms of action remained intact.149
In part, this was a victory for professional learning and prestige at the
expense of simplicity and the convenience of clients. Such a result is
evident in the battles over the constitutionally mandated abolition of the
distinction between equitable and legal jurisdiction. Despite the advantages
of disposing of a dispute in one action, some judges persisted in asserting
that the difference between law and equity was inherent in nature and
insurmountable. These views often went hand in hand, as they did for
Barculo, with an unfavorable view of the capacities of the jury."5
Similar attitudes were not limited to New York lawyers. With the
exception of a brief period in the eighteenth century, Pennsylvania never
had separate equity courts."' Consequently, the commonwealth enjoyed
a rather sophisticated practice of providing equitable relief under common
Hayes, 5 How. Pr. 470 (1851) (holding that immaterial facts should be stricken from
pleadings, leaving only the facts essential to the cause of action); Millilin v. Cary, 5 How.
Pr. 272 (1850) (finding that a complaint requesting injunctive relief, although traditionally
an action at equity, must conform to the Code); Glenny v. Hitchins, 4 How. Pr. 98 (1849)
(concluding that, under the Code, a demurrer that fails to specify the grounds for an
objection may be disregarded).
148. Goulet v. Asseler, 22 N.Y. 225, 228 (1860).
149. See GEORGE VAN SANTVOORD, A TREATISE ON THE PRINCIPLES OF PLEADING
IN CIVIL ACTIONS UNDER THE NEW YORK CODE OF PROCEDURE 2 (Nathaniel C. Moak
ed., Albany, John Parsons 1873). This edition preserves van Santvoord's original text, with
Moak's additions in brackets. Id. at iv. Citations are to the pagination of this edition; the
original pagination is preserved in the margins.
150. See, e.g., Alger v. Scoville, 6 How Pr. 131 (1851), discussed supra notes 109-39
and accompanying text; see also Wooden v. Waffle, 6 How. Pr. 145 (1851) (finding that
under the Code, unlike the common law, an equity pleading is not limited to facts essential
to the cause of action, but limited to facts that have a bearing on the case other than
establishing another fact in the controversy); Knowles v. Gee, 4 How. Pr. 317 (1850)
(determining that under the Code, as under the common law, a pleading must contain only
facts that are essential to the cause of action and not mere evidence of the facts); Shaw v.
Jayne, 4 How. Pr. 119 (1849) (stating that under the Code, as under the common law, a
pleading shall contain only the facts necessary to reach a decision on the cause of action,
and any additional information shall be stricken from the pleadings). See generally
Williams, supra note 114, at 306. Williams notes that "the primary justification for the
rules of misjoinder became the jury." Id. He takes a somewhat more sympathetic view of
Barculo's opinion in Alger, finding that it properly reflected shortcomings in the Code, but
concludes that the New York courts took a "legalistic" view of the causes of action that
severely limited the effects of the Code's "reforms." Id. at 318-24.
151. See WILLIAM H. LOYD, THE EARLY COURTS OF PENNSYLVANIA 191-95 (1910).
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law forms. Problems existed however, because not all equitable remedies
were available.152 Yet, starting in the 1820s, prominent, self-consciously
scientific practitioners confidently maintained that it was time for them to
enjoy a fully developed and separate equity practice, which would mean
the introduction of precisely those complexities that New York was
struggling to abolish." Pennsylvania's combined system was not
without articulate defenders, yet the almost complacent tone of the calls
for "reform" highlights the close relationship between procedural science
and the self-image of status-conscious practitioners.1"
El.
As revealing of attitudes towards professionalism as the struggle over
the implementation of the Field Code was, its outcome helped transform
ideas of what legal science was all about. The forms of action had
provided the framework for the organization of the principles of legal
science. 5 Because the resulting schema was intimately related to the
152. See id. at 159-211.
153. See id. at 208-10.
154. See, e.g., id. at 159-211 (discussing the tension between the courts of law and
the courts of equity); Horace Binney, Eulogium on Chief Justice 7ilghman, 16 Serg. &
Rawle 437, 446-49 (1827) (describing the efforts of Pennsylvania's chief justice to save the
state's court system from the incorporation of law and equity); Sydney G. Fisher, The
Administration of Equity Through Common Law Forms, 1 LAW Q. REV. 455, 463-65
(1885) (discussing the impossibility of eliminating the courts of equity); see also WIfl/AM
H. RAWLE, EQUITY IN PENNSYLVAIA: A LEc'nJRE DEuVERED BEFORE THE LAW
ACADEmy OF PHILADELPHrA 54-55, 68 (Philadelphia, Kay & Brother 1868) (stating that
colonial judges and lawyers in Pennsylvania were incapable of distinguishing the difference
between law and equity).
Pennsylvania lawyers agitating for the creation of separate equity courts may have had
in mind their reputation in the eyes of their brethren in other states. In Rensselaer Glass
Factory v. Reid, 5 Cow. 587 (1825), a New York state senator in his role as judge of the
Court of Errors described a Pennsylvania action that combined both legal and equitable
features as being "to us, and according to our ideas of law, a perfect monster," and as a
result of "the courts of common law in that State being obliged to strain their jurisdiction
to cover such cases, from there being no Court of Chancery established there." Id. at 630.
The product of such a system was not a trustworthy precedent, a conclusion that seems to
isolate Pennsylvania in the American legal community. See generally Stanley N. Katz, The
Politics of Law in Colonial America: Controversies over Chancery Courts and Equity Law
in the Eighteenth Century, 5 PUSP. AM. HIST. 257, 257-326 (1971) (discussing
Pennsylvania's longing for a separation between law and equity, and for formal equity
procedure). But cf ANTHONY LAUSSAT, JR., AN ESSAY ON EQUITY IN PENNSYLvANIA 79
(Philadelphia, Robert Desilver 1826) (advocating that Pennsylvania's system of special
pleading avoids the "dilatoriness" of the forms of equity).
155. See supra notes 114-23 and accompanying text.
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actual practice of law, practice and theory were well integrated. To some
degree, all lawyers could be part of the professional culture, no matter
how uninvolved they had been with the creation of scientific systems of
commercial or maritime insurance law."S The Field Code smashed that
world, first in the State of New York and later elsewhere, as code
pleading spread.' Yet, whatever David Dudley Field hoped the changes
would accomplish, the New York courts managed to limit the effect of the
Code to the abolition of the forms of action as verbal formulas only, not
as legal concepts."' Since the stock allegations and fictions of the forms
no longer meant anything, however, lawyers and courts were forced to
articulate clearly the legal principles that lay behind concepts like
trover,' -9 replevin, 16 assumpsit,' 6 ' and debt.
The description of the new system given in one of the first treatises
on New York code pleading explains the change quite succinctly. George
van Santvoord, author of A Treatise on the Principles of Pleading in Civil
Actions Under the New York Code of Procedure,162 was a successful
lawyer in Troy, near Albany, who, after the passage of the Code quickly
became a leading authority on its meaning. Van Santvoord noted in his
work, first published in 1852, that "[i]n order to frame a pleading
correctly under the new system, not only the rules of pleading, properly
speaking, but the legal principles involved in the action, and upon which
the relief depends, must be thoroughly understood. " " For example,
the traditional form used for the action of trover alleged that A was
possessed of property that he lost and that B found.' It further alleged
that although requested to return it, B retained the property and converted
156. See William A. Fletcher, The General Common Law and Section 34 of the
Judiciary Act of 1789: The Example of Marine Insurance, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1513 (1984);
LaPiana, supra note 13, at 792-830.
157. See generally CHARLEs E. CLARK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CODE PLEADING
23-31 (2d ed. 1947) (detailing the adoption of code pleading in the United States and some
of its benefits).
158. See supra notes 12449 and accompanying text.
159. Trover is a remedy for wrongful appropriation of goods or chattels of another.
See BLAcK's LAW DIcTIONARY 1508 (6th ed. 1990).
160. Replevin is an action whereby the owner or one entitled to goods or chattels may
rec wer them from another who has wrongfully taken or detained such goods or chattels.
See id. at 1299.
161. Assumpsit is a promise that one person assumes or undertakes to do some act or
pay something to another. See id. at 122.
162. VAN SANTVOORD, supra note 149.
163. Id. at 165.
164. See id. at 3.
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it to his own use." These allegations, however, were not necessarily
true.
No request was, perhaps, ever made, and no loss or finding was
necessary to be proved, and yet the pleading was theoretically
good; and the plaintiff was allowed to show any state of facts to
prove that the defendant had converted, or sold, or destroyed, or
was exercising unlawful dominion over the property.166
Such a disparity between the statements of the pleading and the
plaintiff's grievance was not tolerated under the Code, which required that
the plaintiff plead only the facts constituting the cause of action. 67 The
result of this requirement to plead facts was clear:
In what cases, therefore, it may be asked, is a demand
necessary to be alleged in an action which would have been
formerly trover, or an action to recover personal property? This
question, often a nice and difficult question of law, it will be
seen, must be first satisfactorily solved before the pleading can be
correctly drawn; for no general form of pleading can meet every
variety of case, particularly where it may be desirable to verify




168. Id. at 4. As originally enacted, § 120 of the Code required the complaint, the
pleading that began the plaintiffs suit, to be "[a] statement of the facts constituting the
cause of action, in ordinary and concise language, without repetition, and in such a manner
as to enable a person of common understanding to know what is intended." Id. at 161. In
the 1851 amendment of the Code, the definition of the complaint is found in subdivision
two of § 142: "A plain and concise statement of the facts constituting a cause of action
without unnecessary repetition." Id. at 162. Van Santvoord maintained that the consensus
of authority held the two provisions to have the same substantive meaning. See id. The
latter formulation does seem to be more sparing of professional sensibilities. Some,
however, would not be reconciled. Charles O'Conor was a prominent New York
practitioner, the length of whose career resembles Field's. His opposition to the Code of
Procedure may have begun in his opposition suggesting "pride and pique" to the judiciary
provisions of the 1846 constitution. See BERGAN, supra note 87, at 28.
In 1870, South Carolina adopted the New York Code of Procedure. Two attorneys in
Columbia wrote to O'Conor asking him to suggest books that they might acquire to help
them understand pleading and practice under the Code. O'Conor's answer was an extended
criticism of the Code and of "its sole author" David Dudley Field. O'Conor singled out for
special criticism the requirement that only facts be pleaded. It is clear from his description
of the kind of pleading resulting from that requirement that all science had been destroyed.
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A similar result obtained when the common counts, the traditional
method of dealing with contract actions, were considered.1" The various
promises and requests for payment or performance involved in the actions
of indebitatus assumpsit,'" quantum meruit,171 quantum valebant,172
and the account stated "were scarcely anything more than mere legal
fictions."" 7 Both implied and express promises were stated positively,
with the implied promise proved by showing the facts from which the law
implied a promise.174 Under the Code, however, implied requests or
promises could not be pleaded. 75 "The facts raising the implication, and
they alone, should be stated, because they alone are to be proved."176
Now, according to my conception, it requires somebody much more wise or
more subtle than myself, or any special pleader I have ever been acquainted
with, to define or find out what it is that should be stated in a regular pleading
drawn in compliance with this requisite of the Code. I am not aware that anyone
has ever attempted to do it. The common practice in this state is to tell your
story precisely as your client tells it to you, just as any old woman in trouble for
the first time would narrate her grievances, and to annex by way of schedules,
respectively marked A, B, C, &e., copies of any papers or documents that you
may imagine may help your case. This is most emphatically a fair description of
all the pleadings which come from the office of the chief codifier himself [Field].
Letter from Charles O'Conor to Pope & Haskell (Mar. 14, 1870) (published in COLUM.
S.C. GUARDIAN, Mar. 14, 1870), reprinted in 1 ALB. L.J. 302, 303 (1870). For a modern
view of the maler, describing O'Conor's view as a "legalistic" interpretation of the Code,
see CLARK, supra note 157, at 129-30. Clark states that "the view most nearly approaching
the Code ideal and affording the most practically convenient results" is one that sees the
statement of facts required by the Code as limited to what "a lay onlooker" would see as
"a single occurrence or affair, without particular reference to the resulting legal right or
rights." Id. at 130. For further discussion of the role of facts in the Field Code, see
Subrin, supra note 100, at 328-31.
169. For a discussion on the common counts-actions for debts or accounts due-see
CLARK, supra note 157, at 287-93.
170. Indebitatus assumpsit is a form of action that alleges a debt is due from the
defendant and then states that the defendant promised to pay the obligation. See BLACK's
LAW DICnONARY, supra note 159, at 768.
171. Quantum merit is an equitable doctrine, based on the premise that no one who
benefits by the labor or materials of another should be unjustly enriched. In such
cireumstances, the law will imply a promise to pay a reasonable amount for services and
goods provided, even absent a specific contract. See id. at 1243.
172. Quantum valebant is a cause of action for damages founded on the promise by
a defendant to pay a plaintiff the reasonable value of goods sold and delivered. See id. at
1244.
173. VAN SANTVOORD, supra note 149, at 197-99.
174. See id. at 197-98.
175. See id. at 197-99.
176. Id. at 199.
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The successful practitioner could no longer depend on a book of form
pleadings. "Under the Code," van Santvoord wrote, "precedents are, in
general, to be invented, and cannot in all cases be prepared beforehand for
use. The pleader is required to understand the legal principles on which
his action is based, the evidence necessary to support it, the general rules
of pleading, and make his forms for himself. it es
In the past, research might have been limited to a search of precedents
such as those collected in Chitty or in Story's first work, with perhaps a
reference to digests such as Nathan Dane's, 178 to find statements of
general principles. Under the Code, however, the careful lawyer had to
concentrate on a close reading of earlier cases to find a narrower sort of
precedent-one in which the facts resembled the case at hand. Somehow,
the lawyer had to find the legal essence of the actions represented by these
earlier cases and express it in his complaint. The premium put on a
specific scrutiny of previous cases is shown by the additions made by
Nathaniel Moak to the revised edition of van Santvoord's treatise,
published in 1873. Almost all the additional material is a recitation of the
facts of individual cases, culminating in a new chapter, "Complaint in
Particular Cases"-two hundred pages of short synopses of cases grouped
by broad subjects, such as "illegal contract," "infants," "mistake," and
even "milk," the latter of which reads in full:
An action for fraudulently adulterating milk may be brought in
the name of the owner of a cheese-manufactory and its patrons,
where the cheese is to be divided in proportion to the quantity of
milk furnished by each; and so by the treasurer of such
association.'
It is unlikely that a legal world dominated by the organizational framework
provided by the forms of action would have found room for a
classification such as "milk."
The tendency to emphasize the particulars of previous cases, in an
effort to identify exact principles applicable to the case at hand, was
promoted by the sort of pleading required of a defendant in response to a
plaintiff's statement of the facts giving rise to his cause of action. The
177. Id. at 5.
178. Nathan Dane was a Revolutionary War-era lawyer and statesman who was a
delegate to the Continental Congress in 1785. In 1823, Dane published the first
comprehensive work on American law, entitled General Abridgement and Digest of
American Law. Dane established a chair at Harvard Law School-the Dane
professorship-a position subsequently held by Christopher Langdell. See CAMBRIDGE
BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY 383 (Cambridge Univ. Press ed., 1990).
179. VAN SANTVOORD, supra note 149, at 376.
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Code required the defendant's answer to contain a denial of the plaintiff's
allegations that he wished to controvert, and a statement of any new
matter constituting a defense." 8 This provision had the effect of
abolishing the old learning on the general issue, which was specific to
each form of action and denied all the plaintiff's allegations, and on the
special pleading, which involved "the allegation of special or new matter,
as distinguished from a direct denial of matter previously alleged on the
opposite side.""' The complications arising from the relationship
between these two aspects of answering a plaintiff's suit were legion:
A mingling of logic and illogic, not untinctured by tricklings of
medieval scholasticism, appears throughout the whole discipline.
It has yielded the special traverse with its enigmatic negation, the
plea to the further maintenance of the action, the plea puis
darrein continuance; has elaborated the learning of profert and
oyer, of color, of protestation, of duplicity, of anticipation, of
departure, of new assignment, of repleader, of aider, and other
like positive and negative phases of enginery; has, in short,
constructed an arcanum of forensic statement penetrable only by
the initiate.12
The learning that grew up around the Code might be regarded, and
properly so, as equally arcane. First, the legislature changed its mind three
times on the possibility of allowing a "general denial," finally resolving
the question in the affirmative in 1852, thereby destroying the formulae
of the general issue of common law pleading."s Second, deciding what
the general denial did deny was no easy task, complicating in turn the
determination of what had to be specifically denied.' " Once again, as
with the question of what the plaintiff had to put in his complaint in order
to get into court, writing an answer that would withstand judicial scrutiny
became an inquiry devoted to the careful teasing out from prior cases of
180. See 1848 Code of Procedure § 149, 1848 N.Y. Laws at 522.
181. GOULD, supra note 51, § 18, at 10; CHARLES M. HEPBURN, THE HISTORICAL
DEVELOPMENT OF CODE PLEADING IN AMERICA AND ENGLAND 247-49 (Cincinnati,
Anderson 1897); NELSON, supra note 20, at 72-73.
182. MILLAR, supra note 82, at 34; see also 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF ENGLAND 305-06 (photo. reprint 1966) (Oxford,
Clarendon 1765) (noting that "the science of special pleading [has] been frequently
perverted to the purposes of chicane and delay").
183. See HEPBURN, supra note 181, §§ 289-90, at 252, § 291, at 253.
184. See the elaborate discussion of this issue in VAN SANTVOORD, supra note 149,
at 510-47.
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the exact factual elements necessary to sustain the action and thus possible
to deny, either generally or specifically.
A similar development occurred in England as a result of the first
attempts to thoroughly reform common law pleading in the mother
country. Adopting the suggestions of the Second Report of the Common
Law Procedure Commissioners, issued in 1820, the judges of the English
courts promulgated new rules of pleading in the Hilary Term of 1834,
from which they take their name."s These rules abolished the general
issue and required special pleading."s In an article written more than
sixty years ago for the Cambridge Law Journal, W.S. Holdsworth
suggested that this change had a significant effect on substantive law.1
Forced to come out from behind the convenient obfuscation of the
formulaic general issue, lawyers and judges had to pay close attention to
older precedents that carefully distinguished between the forms of action,
giving better guidance as to what elements were necessary to sustain the
action (and therefore that must be denied to defeat it) than "the looser
reasoning, and almost pointed disregard for the differences between the
forms of action which had characterized many of the eighteenth-century
decisions," in at least some areas of substantive law."'
The provisions of the New York Code governing defendant's answer
were perceived as similar to the Rules of Hilary Term, at least by Judge
Samuel L. Selden of the New York Court of Appeals. In McKyring v.
Bull,"' the leading case on the relationship between the general denial
of the Code and the general issue of the old pleading, Selden both pointed
out the analogous nature of the changes made in New York and Great
Britain, and engaged in the sort of analysis that Holdsworth identified as
one of the results of reform.1" The plaintiff in McKyring alleged that he
185. See Hilary Term 1834, 3 & 4 Will. 4, ch. 42, § I (Eng.); see also W.S.
Holdsworth, The New Rules of Pleading of the Hilary Term, 1834, 1 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 261,
270-78 (1923) (discussing the impact of the Hilary Rules on the development of substantive
law); Alison Reppy, The Hilary Rules and Their Effect on Negative and Affinnative Pleas
Under Modern Codes and Practice Acts, 6 N.Y.U. L. REV. 95 (1929) (detailing how the
Hilary Rules restored the strict theory of pleading).
186. See Holdsworth, supra note 185, at 270.
187. See id. at 273-78.
188. Id. at 276. Holdsworth discusses: "(1) Developments in the doctrine of
consideration; (2) the development of the distinction between trover and trespass de bonis
asporatis; and (3) the scope of the modification of the rule actio personalis [moritur cum
persona] [personal actions do not survive the death of the injured party]." Id. at 273; see
also id. at 274-77 (illustrating the development in these three areas of substantive law).
189. 16 N.Y. 297 (1857).
190. See id. at 302-03, 306-07, 309; see also HEPBURN, supra note 181, § 292, at254
(stating that the general denial is different from the general issue in that it permits a less
[Vol. 36
THE FIELD CODE
had done work for the defendant worth $650 and that defendant still owed
him $134 of that amount. 191 The defendant answered with a general
denial of all the allegations in the complaint. 1 2 At trial, the court did not
allow the defendant to offer proof of payment or of partial payment in
mitigation of damages because neither had been pleaded. 13
The case eventually made its way to the court of appeals for a
decision on exactly what could be proved by a defendant whose only
pleading was a general denial."9 Selden's opinion for a divided
court 95 rested completely on the nature of sound pleading as
demonstrated by English experience. He concluded that sound pleading
required that defendants be allowed to deny only facts, not legal
conclusions."9 In this case, the plaintiff's claim for $134 as the balance
due rested on a legal conclusion; the facts he alleged showed he was
entitled to a greater amount.T' A general denial puts the existence of the
larger debt into question.198 To allow the defendant to then offer
evidence of payment-in technical terms, to allow him to offer evidence
in confession and avoidance, admitting that he once owed something, but
no longer-would unfairly surprise the plaintiff and set at naught the
object of pleading, to inform each side of what the other hoped to
prove."9 The offer to prove partial payment met the same fate.3
Section 246 of the Code required the court to give judgment for a plaintiff
whose sworn complaint based on a contract requesting money only is not
answered by the defendant.201 In addition, section 149 required the
answer to include a statement of any new matter constituting a defense or
extensive range of testimony and has a less certain application in particular instances);
Reppy, supra note 185, at 99 (asserting that Justice Selden, in McKyring v. Bull, attributed
the different result in debt and assumpsit to the different phraseology in the two general
issues, nil debet and non assurpsit).
191. See McKyring, 16 N.Y. at 297.
192. Id. at 303.
193. Id. at 298.
194. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's decision with Judge Selden writing
for the majority. See id. at 297.
195. One judge concurred in a separate opinion (not reported), three simply
"concurred," one expressed no opinion at all, and two dissented without opinion. See id.
at 309.
196. See id. at 303.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. See id. at 297, 303-04.
200. See id. at 304.
201. See id. at 308.
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counterclaim.' Selden found that these two sections, read together,
require defendants to plead partial payment or lose the benefit of it. 2
More significant than the result in McKyring, however, is the method
of Selden's opinion. He began by noting that although the Code had
"abrogated the common law system of pleading, with all its technical
rules," the general denial is similar to the general issue.'t English
decisions on the scope of the general issue would "throw much light on
the question presented here. " ' Selden then went into a detailed
discussion of the differences between the nil debet, the general issue in
actions of debt, and the plea non assumpsit, the general issue in
assumpsit.' 6
Originally, according to Selden, the law recognized, and properly so,
the fact that nil debet (does not owe) is in the present tense and that non
assumpsit (never promised) is in the past, citing two seventeenth-century
cases decided by Lord Chief Justice Holt.' Under non assumpsit,
therefore, no evidence could be offered that related to events after the
promise, such as partial payment."5 This crucial distinction was lost
sight of in a misguided attempt to sacrifice form for substance.
Justifications were attempted, but they were based on an incorrect
understanding of the nature of the action of assumpsit. These "errors"
subverted the object of pleading by allowing the defendant to offer all
sorts of evidence about events taking place after the making of the promise
202. See id. at 307.
203. See id. at 304-09. The close distinctions fostered by the sort of reasoning Selden
used are illustrated by Quin v. Lloyd, 41 N.Y. 349 (1869). In Quin, the plaintiff's
complaint stated that the defendant had hired him for $15 a week and that defendant was
indebted to him in a certain amount "[b]eing the balance remaining due, after sundry
payments made by defendant to said Richard Quin." Id. at 350 (emphasis added). This
statement offered no facts to show exactly how much the plaintiff was due, unlike the
complaint in McKyring, which stated the total amount due to the plaintiff ($650).
Therefore, a general denial put into question the existence of the agreement, the number
of weeks worked and the making of the "sundry payments" that reduced the amount owed.
In McKyring, the amount claimed by the plaintiff ($134) was itself a legal conclusion. See
id. at 352-53.
204. McKyring, 16 N.Y. at 298.
205. Id. at 299.
206. See id. at 302-06.
207. See id. at 299. In the anonymous case 1 Salk. 278 (1690), Lord Holt stated
"that; in debt for rent, nil debet pleaded the statute of limitations may be given in evidence,
for the statute has made it no debt at the time of the plea pleaded, the words of which are
in the present tense." Id. Again, in Draper v. Glassop, 1 Ld. Ray. 153 (1697), Holt stated
that "[i]f the defendant pleads non assumpsit, he cannot give in evidence the statute of
limitations, because the assumpsit goes to the praetor [past] tense." Id. at 153.
208. See McKyring, 16 N.Y. at 299-301.
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or the creation of the debt without having to tell the plaintiff what he
planned to do.21 The plaintiff was thus forced to do an unmanageable
amount of preliminary work or take the chance of being caught
unprepared, a situation a proper system of pleading should avoid.210 The
Rules of Hilary Term, however, corrected these mistakes by prohibiting
introduction of evidence of payment or of defenses other than "never
promised" or "never indebted" under the general issue in debt and
assumpsit. 211 The judge drew two conclusions from his "brief review"
of the English experience:
The first is, that no argument in favor of allowing payment, or
any other matter in confession and avoidance, to be given in
evidence under a general denial, can be deduced from the former
practice in that respect, as this practice has been abandoned in
England, not only as productive of serious inconvenience, but as
a violation of all sound rules of interpretation.
A second inference is that, in regard to pleading, it is
indispensable to adhere to strict logical precision in the
interpretation of language."'
Selden concluded that to allow proof of subsequent events under the
general denial would cause the very problem the English courts had
corrected through the Hilary Rules, which embodied the same spirit that
animated the Code: "It was evidently designed to require of parties, in all
cases, a plain and distinct statement of the facts which they intend to
prove. And any rule which would enable defendants, in a large class of
cases to evade this requirement, would be inconsistent with this
design. "213
Selden's discussion of the possibility of offering evidence of partial
payment in mitigation of damages concluded that the evidence would have
209. See id.
210. See id.
211. See id. at 298-302; see also Reppy, supra note 185, at 98-110 (discussing the
history of the Hilary Rules and generally supporting Selden's view in McKyring).
212. McKyring, 16 N.Y. at 302.
213. Id. at 304-05; see also Reppy, supra note 185, at 96-98. Reppy agrees with
Selden's judgment that the Hilary Rules and the Code shared the same spirit, and argues
that an understanding of the English experience will help illuminate American reform
procedure, a position that Reppy shows is contrary to the received wisdom. See id. At least
one contemporary court agreed with Selden: "These regulations [the Hilazy Rules] restored
the ancient rule, and placed the science of pleading upon its true principle. The framers of
the New York Code, from which ours is mainly taken, would seem to have intended to ac-
complish the same result." Piercy v. Sabin, 10 Cal. 22, 29-30 (1858).
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to be allowed under the general denial because it could be offered under
the Hilary Rules, due to the close correspondence between the Code and
the English rules.2" 4 Such an interpretation, of course, violated the
nature of pleading as fair notice. Realizing this, the English judges issued
the Rule of Trinity Term, requiring that payment be pleaded rather than
simply offered as evidence of mitigation under the general issue.215 So
similar in spirit were the Hilary Rules and the Code that the Rule of
Trinity Term would have to be enacted in New York to avoid the
unwanted result." 6 Fortunately, it was possible to construe the Code as
requiring partial payment to be pleaded.2"7 This being so, Selden
concluded with the satisfied observation that the Code was actually better
constructed than the English system.2"'
Selden's argument illustrates Holdsworth's hypothesis. Seventeenth-
century cases that properly maintained the distinctions between actions and
pleas were the correct models. Subsequent corruption was cured by the
Rules of Hilary Term, which had the same aim as the New York Code,
although one has the impression that, on the whole, Selden preferred
judges over the legislature as reformers of procedure.219
The views of one judge, however, did not justify any generalization
about the effect of the changes wrought by the Code of Procedure on
substantive law. The Rules of Hilary Term, after all, did not abolish the
forms of action; their effect on the study of principles underlying the
forms came from changing the type of answer the defendant was required
to give. The New York Code exacted far greater change and certainly
could accommodate the removal from New York's jurisprudence of the
distinctions Holdsworth saw being strengthened in England. Two points
of view were represented in New York, as shown by a brief review of one
of the substantive areas that Holdsworth examined.
Holdsworth used the history of the distinction between trover and
trespass de bonis asportatis as an example of the changes he
described.' The former form of action lay for a conversion of one's
214. See McKyring, 16 N.Y. at 308-09.
215. The Rule of Trinity Term provided that "[p]ayment shall not in any case be
allowed to be given in evidence in reduction of damages or debt, but shall be pleaded in
bar." See id. at 305-06 (quoting 4 R. MEEsON & W.N. WELSBY, REPORTS OF CASES
ARGUED AND DErERMND IN THE COURTS OF EXCHEQUER AND EXCHEQUER CHAMBER
4 (J.1. Clark Hare & H.B. Wallace eds., Philadelphia, T. & J.W. Johnson 1852).
216. See id. at 307-08.
217. See id.
218. See id. at 309.
219. See id. at 308-09.
220. See Holdsworth, supra note 185, at 273-76.
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goods, the latter for an asportation.3' Conversion means the taking of
one's goods by another who uses the goods for himself.' Asportation
is the simple taking away of the goods.' An asportation could become
a conversion if, for example, after the taking away, the aggrieved party
demands the goods, and the demand was refused.' Broadly put,
trespass involves force; trover does not.' The distinction between the
two was blurred in eighteenth-century English cases, but was revived,
according to Holdsworth, after the Hilary Rules.' Although
Holdsworth did not explain the exact connection between the rules and the
substantive law, it seems to lie in Rule V(3): "In actions of trespass de
bonis asportatis, the plea of not guilty [the general issue in trespass] shall
operate as a denial of the defendant having committed the trespass alleged
by taking or damaging the goods mentioned, but not of the plaintiff's
property therein."' This change was significant for maintaining the
distinction between the two actions because the wrong in trespass was the
forcible interference with the goods, and in trover it was the taking for
oneself of what belonged to another. Ownership really did not matter for
trespass, only possession did. As long as you had the goods, rightly
or wrongly, the forcible taking from you was wrong. The plaintiff's title
was unimportant and did not belong in the general issue. 9
In New York, the relationship between the two forms of action
revolved around the question of the defendant making an answer that
challenged the plaintiff's property rights in the goods. Early New York
cases seem to have maintained the distinction.' Confusion crept in
221. Id. at 275-76.
222. Id. at 276.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 275-76.
225. See id.
226. See id.
227. 2 CHARLEs CROMPTON & R. MESSON, REPORTS OF CASES ARGUED AND
DErERMINED IN THE COURTS OF EXCHEQUER AND EXCHEQUER CHAMBER 23 (1.1. Clark
Hare & H.B. Wallace eds., Philadelphia, T. & J.W. Johnson 1852).
228. See CLARK, supra note 157, at 79-80.
229. See Holdsworth, supra note 185, at 274-76.
230. See, e.g., Schermerhorn v. van Volkenburgh, 11 Johns. 529 (1814) (holding that
title in a third person can be shown under general issue in trover); Demick v. Chapman,
11 Johns. 132 (1814) (stating that ownership by plaintiff cannot be offered under a general
issue in trespass de bonis asportatis); see also Faulkner v. Brown, 13 Wend. 63 (1834)
(maintaining that an action in trover requires the plaintiff to have a general issue or special
property right); Aildn v. Buck, 1 Wend. 466 (1828) (holding that the right to reduce
property in actual possession is sufficient to entitle a party to bring an action in trespass de
bonis asportatis); Cook v. Howard, 13 Johns. 276 (1816) (declaring that for an action in
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through the 1850s.?1
In Kissam v. Roberts,2 a case decided by the Superior Court of
New York City in 1860, the distinctions were restated and reinforced in
terms of the Code. The plaintiff's complaint charged that the defendant
had wrongfully taken from him his goods and chattels, namely a schooner
with its attendant tackle and other gear. 3 The defendant answered by
general denial.' On trial below, the Court did not allow the defendant
to give any evidence as to the plaintiff's lack of ownership of the
schooner, as opposed to mere possession." The jury rendered a verdict
for the plaintiff and judgment was entered for $4,210, the value of the
vessel plus interest. 6
On appeal, defendant's counsel maintained that ownership of the
vessel was a material issue under the Code and that evidence regarding it
should have been admitted. 7 Plaintiff's counsel maintained that the
cause of action was trover and that under that cause of action a general
denial precludes the defendant from offering evidence pertaining to
title. 8 Judge Murry Hoffman upheld the verdict for the plaintiff, but
without approving plaintiff's counsel's interpretation of the applicable
law. 9 According to Judge Hoffman, "[t]he Code recognizes the
principles of the old actions, though all the forms of pleading are
abolished."' The principles applicable in this case, however, were
those of trespass de bonis asportatis, not trover 41 Plaintiff's counsel
was incorrect in maintaining that ownership was irrelevant in trover, in
spite of the confusion found in some of the cases. u 2 The two actions
were distinct and the principles governing them were distinct as well.3
trespass de bonis asportatis it is improper for the defendant to show property in a stranger
to excuse the trespass and justify the taking).
231. See Kissam v. Roberts, 6 Bos. 154, 161-63 (1860).
232. 6 Bos. at 154.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. See id. at 155-56.
236. Id. at 154.
237. See id. at 154-57.
238. See id. at 158-59.
239. See id. at 160-65.
240. Id. at 160.
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. See id. at 157-64. Hoffman also found support in the Hilary Rules provision
regarding trespass de bonis asportais, discussed supra notes 220-29 and accompanying
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Here, then, was a case in which the reforms of the Code led to a
reexamination and reinforcement of old distinctions, similar to that which
Holdsworth describes for England. The ultimate resolution of the issue,
however, was in favor of a radical interpretation of the Code. In 1868, a
superior court decision upheld a complaint, the allegations of which
mingled elements of trespass and trover, although not without a strongly
worded dissent that maintained the inviolable nature of the different forms
of action, which the majority characterized as "that incubus upon the
administration of substantial justice."'" The decision was later affirmed
by the court of appeals without opinion.'
This history of controversy over the meaning of the Code of
Procedure was a matter of daily professional life for Christopher Langdell
and his partners. Langdell left New York having dealt on a daily basis
with the need to understand the Code and therefore with the sort of
research required to formulate proper pleadings. It is tempting to imagine
Langdell agreeing with the conservative interpretation of the Code, seeing
the principles of.the forms of action still alive, and finding them best
expressed in the older English cases Holdsworth described.
The research necessary to find these principles, the careful searching
of past cases for particular circumstances that might provide analogies to
the matter at hand and provide raw material from which to induce general
principles, could also have been reinforced by Langdell's focus on cases
as a law student.' Because of poor eyesight, which was to fail
completely at the height of his teaching career, Langdell had other
students read to him. One of them was the future Episcopal Bishop of
Fond du Lac, Wisconsin, Charles Grafton.
He used to get me to read aloud with him evenings, along with
[George Otis] Shattuck, for I had the small accomplishment of
reading well. He taught us how, from his point of view, to study
law. He began with the cases of leading import. We had to read
them, and then state the points to him. Then he made us read all
the leading authorities on such cases, and so he pounded certain
principles of law into us.'
text.
244. Colton v. Jones, 7 Rob. 164, 172 (1868).
245. See Legal Intelligence, 6 ALB. L.J. 166, 168 (1871) (listing all the decisions of
the New York Court of Appeals from July 1, 1870 to June 21, 1872).
246. See Marcia Speziale, Langdell's Concept of Law As Science: The Beginning of
Anti-Formalism in American Legal Theory, 5 VT. L. REV. 1, 8-9 (1980).
247. 2 CHARLEs WARREN, HISTORY OF THE HARvARD LAW SCHOOL AND OF EARLY
LEGAL CONDrTONS IN AMERICA 179 (1908).
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In addition, Langdell's experience as Theophilus Parsons's research
assistant may have contributed to his fascination with the case. During the
latter part of his study at Harvard Law School, Langdell was the school's
librarian. He also aided Parsons in writing his treatise on the law of
contracts, first published in 1853.2 According to Parsons's preface to
his work, his assistants undertook a specific task, dictated by his decision
to exclude references to cases from his text.2" To discuss cases
supporting his assertions in the body of his work, Parsons feared, would
inevitably lead his readers to slight or even ignore cases opposing or
modifying the principles in the text.' The result would be unpleasant
surprises, should they ever find themselves arguing in court a question
involving those principles. He therefore relegated all discussion of cases
to notes, some of which contained extensive quotation from and abstracts
of cases that contradicted or modified the text. Langdell and his fellow
assistants aided in preparing of the notes, and their work was certainly
thorough:
More than six thousand cases are referred to in this volume; but
from the beginning to the end of the book no case is cited because
cited elsewhere, none merely on the authority of an index or
digest, or of a marginal or head note, none without actual
investigation of the case in its whole extent, and none without a
subsequent and independent verification of the citation."
Langdell's understanding of the law of contracts was formed by the
careful explication of, decided cases. Under the direction of a respected
teacher, he learned to look for the law in a rigorous dissection of judges'
reasoning. When he came to practice at the bar of New York, that
dissection turned out to be the essence of practice.
Langdell's vision of the case method involved more than the
techniques of practice. To some degree, he believed that the principles he
discovered through the examination of cases were the true essence of law.
The triumph of his teaching method, however, was not as closely related
to the legal science that lay behind it as it was to other factors, including
the changing nature of the university and the social situation of the legal
profession.' 2 The relationship to the realities of practice, however, was
248. See 1 THEOPHILUS PARSONS, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS at x (Boston, Little &
Brown 1853).
249. See id. at viii.
250. See id.
251. Id. at x.
252. It seems that the case method actually contradicted at least one version of legal
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just as important. In fact, it could be said that the case method came along
at just the right time.
IV.
The spread of code pleading, with its emphasis on finding precedents
factually similar to the case at hand, led naturally to the growth of law
reporting. With the advent of the Field Code, the number of reporters of
the decisions of the New York courts increased. Some were dedicated
solely to opinions dealing with matters of pleading and procedure under
the Code.3 Opinions of lower courts were now regularly being printed,
not because they were binding authority, but because lawyers needed
access to opinions in which the procedural effect of different fact patterns
was considered. In 1866, one New York lawyer estimated that in the
seventeen years of the Code's existence, the courts rendered some 4500
opinions interpreting its provisions. I Soon there was a market for an
annual digest of New York law, which attempted to classify and
summarize these numerous reported cases 55 By 1882, one commentator
observed that the volume of the New York digest for 1881 included cases
in two volumes of Abbott's New Cases, one of City Court
Reports, two of Howard's Practice, three of the Supreme Court,
five of the Court of Appeals, one of Civil Procedure Reports, one
of New York Superior Court Reports, one of Surrogate Reports,
besides the New York Daily Register, Monthly Law Bulletin, and
Weekly Digest.2m
science prevalent in the late nineteenth century. I have tried to describe some aspects of
that legal science in William P. LaPiana, The Legal Culture of the Formative Period in
Sherman Act Jurisprudence, 35 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 827 (1990).
253. See, e.g., 1 BENJAMIN V. ABBOTr & AUSTIN ABBOTT, REPORTS OF PRACTICE
CASES DETERMINED IN THE COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW-YORK: WITH A DIGEST OF ALL
PoINTS OF PRACTICE EMBRACED IN THE STANDARD NEW-YORK REPORTS ISSUED DURING
THE PERIOD COVERED BY THIS VOLUME (New York, Diossy 1866); 1 GEORGE D.
MCCARTY, CIVIL PROCEDURE REPORTS CONTAINING CASES UNDER THE CODE OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE AND THE GENERAL CIVIL PRACTICE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK (New York,
S.S. Peloubet 1882).
254. Charles P. Kirkland, Address to the Graduating Class of the Law School of
Columbia College 10 (May 16, 1866) (transcript available in Columbia Law School
Library).
255. See GOULD'S ANNUAL DIGEST OF NEW YORK REPORTS (1881).
256. I.L. High, What Shall be Done with the Reports?, 16 AM. L. REV. 429, 434
(1882).
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He predicted that soon the law of other states would be in the same sorry
mess.2 7
In fact, the nightmare had already become a reality. In 1879, John
West published the first of his regional reporters, which, within a few
years, made available to the profession every opinion of every court of
last resort in the United States as well as the decisions of the federal
courts. 5 The nature of the enterprise was clearly dangerous in the eyes
of some observers. The anonymous reviewer of the first bound volumes
of the West system was aghast at their promiscuousness. Since every
opinion was printed in full, "we have a bushel of chaff to every pint of
grain."" Two years later, another reviewer made much the same point:
"[T]he volumes that are constantly falling from the press teem with
reports of cases of no interest to the profession or to the public, and
important only to the parties litigant."' These concerns, quickened by
the rapid growth of indiscriminate reporting, became a staple of discussion
at the meetings of the American Bar Association in the mid-1880s. In
1884, John F. Dillon, prominent judge and railroad lawyer, gave the
annual address before the ABA and, among other observations, noted that
in 1881 there were over 3000 volumes of reports covering the courts of
the various jurisdictions in the United States, and the number was growing
at more than 100 a year." 1 He later invited the Association to consider
the matter. 2 It was referred to committee and, largely through Dillon's
urging, the Association adopted a resolution deprecating the ungoverned
use of precedent but urging that the publication of opinions in no way be
limited by statute.2
The ABA resolution was a triumph of practicality over theory.
Although Dillon and others believed there could be too much of a good
thing when it came to reporting cases, coping with the tidal wave involved
257. See id. This profusion of precedents may have contributed to what one
commentator saw as a growing lack of reverence for the doctrine of stare decisis among
New York lawyers. See William Green, Stare Decisis, 14 AM. L. REV. 609, 627 (1880).
258. John B. West published his first reporter, The Syllabi, in St. Paul Minnesota.
For a look at the origins and development of the West Reporter System, see Thomas A.
Woxland, "Forever Associated with the Practice of Law": The Early Years of the West
Publishing Company, 5 LEGAL REFERENCE SERVICES Q. 115 (1985).
259. Recent Legal Literature, 11 CENT. L.J. 339, 340 (1880) (reviewing West's
Northwestern Reporter and Federal Reporter).
260. High, supra note 256, at 429.
261. See John F. Dillon, Annual Address, in AMERICAN BAR ASS'N, REPORT OF THE
7TH ANNUAL MEETING 203, 223-24 (1884).
262. See JOHN F. DILLON, THE LAWS AND JURISPRUDENCE IN ENGLAND AND
AMERICA 267 (Leonard W. Levy ed., 1970) (1895).
263. See id. at 289-90; Dillon, supra note 261, at 223-24.
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several strategies, discussion of which must await another day. For now,
it is enough to realize that although lawyers complained about the
multiplication of cases, they also asserted that practice without them was
impossible.
In his address to the class of 1868 at Columbia Law School, Charles
Tracy warned the graduates that searching all the reports to find a case on
point was difficult work.' It was effort well spent, however, because
to be confronted with an unknown but relevant case meant disaster.3
In 1886, the editors of the Central Law Journal dismissed the assertion
that the great number of reported cases was the cause of the problem:
It is idle now to talk of the practice of law at all, without the use
of precedents, as indeed it would have been at any period within
the life time of the common law; and access to the very latest
decisions of the courts is an absolute necessity to a lawyer in
active practice.'
In the same year, in an address before the Allegheny Bar Association,
Harvey Henderson, a Pittsburgh lawyer, said pithily: "The necessity of
consulting many books is the penalty a lawyer must pay for exercising his
profession in this extraordinary age."' 7 There is also evidence that legal
research was based on cases rather than principles. An anonymous review
in the third volume of the American Law Review criticized the author of
a treatise on the law of titles to real estate in New York for not citing
cases by name but only by volume and page and for not including in his
work a table of cases cited.' The need for full citations and a table was
dictated by the way lawyers work; experienced practitioners "habituate
themselves in searching for a principle through the books to follow the
track of a leading case," making a table of cases a necessity. 2 In 1884,
the editors of the same journal asked whether tables of cases "did not
occupy the same economical place in legal literature as the hair on the end
of a man's nose occupies in the human anatomy."' The response: its
264. See Charles Tracy, An Address Delivered Before the Graduating Class of the
Law School of Columbia College 16-17 (May 13, 1868) (transcript available in Columbia
Law School Library).
265. See id.
266. Case Law Again-Audi Alteram Partem, 22 CENT. L.J 577, 578-79 (1886).
267. Harvey Henderson, The Origin and Utility of Case-Law, 33 PITrSBURGH L.J.
301, 305 (1886).
268. See Book Notices, 3 AM. L. REV. 541, 543 (1869) (reviewing Gerard's 7tle to
Real Estate in the State of New York).
269. Id.
270. The original editorial was entitled Hair on the End of a Man's Nose, 18 AM. L.
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readers were unanimously in favor of a table of cases appearing in every
treatiseY 1 Their reasons were clearly summed up by Emlin McClain,
head of the law department at the University of Iowa:
The secret of the whole matter is just this: the title of the case is
a definite clue, having no dependence on the varying notions or
whims of the different authors, while the heading and the sub-
head under which the subject may be referred to in an index is a
matter wholly indefinite and uncertain.'
The most overwhelming evidence of the profession's appetite for cases
was the fate of John West's comprehensive reporters.' As the editors
of the Central Law Journal pointed out, the law of survival of the fittest
would determine whether law books continued to be published or not. 4
There certainly was competition. The American Law Review printed A
Symposium of Law Publishers in 1889, in which James E. Briggs of
Lawyers' Co-op strongly put the argument for the selective reporters that
his organization published: "It had not occurred to us so forcibly until our
experience drove us to study the problem, that so large a proportion of the
decisions contained so little that was new as not to warrant even a bare
publication of the opinion, to say nothing of full reports. "z That
observation might have been true, and it was certainly true that, in
Briggs's words,
[t]here is a generally felt and frequently expressed regret, on the
part of bench and bar here and in England, for the unlimited
production of law books, whether of reports or text-books, which,
instead of simplifying and facilitating a knowledge of the present
state of the law on any given question, complicate and embarrass
it by the very quantity of matter presented for examination and
reconciliation.'7 6
REV. 129 (1884). The quotation is taken from the first of two subsequent editorials
presenting readers' replies. See U.M. Rose, Hair on the End of a Man's Nose, 18 AM. L.
REV. 314, 314 (1884).
271. See Rose, supra note 270, at 314-17.
272. Emlin McClain, More Hair on the End of the Nose, 18 AM. L. REV. 488, 489
(1884).
273. See infra notes 277-85 and accompanying text.
274. See The Origin and Utility of Case-Law, 22 CENT. L.J. 529, 530 (1886).
275. James E. Briggs, A Symposium of Law Publishers, 23 AM. L. REV. 407, 409
(1889).
276. Id. at 407.
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West's enterprise prospered nevertheless. In his contribution to the
publisher's symposium, West summarized the conditions that made him
successful in a way that shows he separated the complaints about the
profusion of cases from the profession's practice of research.' First,
he noted that few questions of law can be answered "by direct reference
to the abstract principles of the law, as taught in the school, or laid down
by the commentators."' Constitutional and statutory provisions must
be investigated and "the decisions of the courts bearing on the point must
be found and compared, before the lawyer can say with any positiveness,
'thus the law is written. ' "' Lawyers also consult treatises, not to find
"[t]he opinions of a learned man, expert in legal lore,"' but to find
"the case law on the subject, as determined not alone in the localjurisdiction, but as shown in the decisions of the courts throughout the
whole United States.""' Before the West reporter system, the lawyer
could never be certain that a nationwide search was complete. Official
reports were slow, and unofficial reporting was haphazard. In the end, the
lawyer "had to go into court uncertain whether he might not be met on the
threshold by his opponent, with controlling precedents to which he had not
had access, and of the existence of which he had not been made
aware."' With the regional reporter system, these fears were assuaged.
Critics called West's innovation the "[b]lanket [s]ystem" of reporting, he
wrote, but he found that a compliment, not a criticism.' "No policy of
insurance is so satisfactory to the insured as the blanket policy; and that
is the sort of policy we issue for the lawyer, seeking insurance against the
loss of his case through ignorance of the law as set forth in the decisions
of the highest courts."'
West gauged his market well. The success of his enterprise reveals
how highly the profession valued access to all possible precedents. In spite
of all rhetoric to the contrary, the basis of research and practice was the
case. Supporters of the case method were certainly wise to portray their
teaching technique as a means of giving the student tools that could be
useful in practice, and they did not hesitate to do so. At Harvard, the
collapse of the required curriculum was part of the transition to an
emphasis on teaching technique rather than legal truth.'
277. See John B. West, A Symposium of Law Publishers, 23 AM. L. REV. 400 (1889).
278. Id. at 400.
279. Id.
280. Id. at 401.
281. Id.
282. Id. at 403.
283. Id. at 406.
284. Id. at 407.
285. See ALFRED Z. REED, TRAINING FOR THE PUBLIC PROFESSION OF THE LAW 308-
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Recognition of the possibility for practical instruction through the
analysis of cases was not limited to Harvard or even to advocates of the
Harvard style of legal education. As early as 1870, a writer in The
Western Jurist defended law schools against the charge of providing solely
theoretical instruction by noting that "the most important result of a course
of professional study. is not so much the amount actually learned, as
the mental habit acquired." s In 1875, William G. Hammond, then
teaching law at Iowa, read a paper on legal education to the American
Social Science Association. He considered several different teaching
methods and asserted that each had its place. 7 The study of cases,
however, was the only way to directly train students in habits of thought
useful to the practitioner." Through the study of cases the student
learns "not only rules, but the sources from which rules proceed; and he
insensibly acquires a habit of measuring the greater or less elasticity of
each rule in connection with diverse states of fact, which is, perhaps, the
best possible substitute for actual practice in ripening the legal
judgment. "'
Devotees of the Harvard system were more explicit in the advantages
of the case method for teaching the student how to deal with the problems
of practice. In 1893, the Columbia Law School Circular, a document
surely acceptable to Dean William Keener, who had brought the case
method to Columbia and who helped to set off the controversy that led to
the founding of New York Law School, emphasized that what the student
did in the classroom--discussing cases and analyzing the relevant and
actual grounds of decision-was "practically . . . what he will be
constantly doing as a lawyer."' The Columbia Law Times saw matters
the same way. The advent of the case method was an improvement, the
editors believed, because "[t]he student now studies the law in the manner
in which he will be called upon to investigate a case when he comes to
active practice.""' Emlin McClain, the Iowa law professor who found
tables of cases useful because the case was the key to legal research, not
10, 380 (1921).
286. Law Schools and Their Course of Study, 4 W. JURIST 125, 131 (1870).
287. See William G. Hammond, Legal Education and the Study of Jurisprudence in
the West and North-West, 8 J. Soc. Sd. 165, 173-76 (1876).
288. See id. at 175-76.
289. Id.
290. Frank S. Rice, Methods of Instruction at American Law Schools. 1. Columbia
College in the City of New York, 6 COUM. L. TIMEs 154, 165 (1893). The Columbia Law
School Circular was an annual publication that reviewed notable events and achievements
by its law students during the school year.
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surprisingly found teaching through cases an important part of legal
education. "Plunge him [the student]," McClain told the ABA in 1893,
"into the midst of a difficulty and then let him help himself out, as a
lawyer or a judge would, by means of an adjudicated case, and he at once
recognizes the utility and discipline of case study."' Even Joel P.
Bishop, who became a vociferous critic of Harvard's methods, was
adamant about the need for every student to learn to critique cases.
The student should, therefore, read case after case; and make, as
he goes on, his own abstracts of the points decided therein, cut
down to the smallest possible dimensions, yet not so close as to
pare off any thing which the case absolutely decides. There is no
exercise more important than this; and it is especially one to be
advantageously done by students in a class, under competent
instruction; as, for example, in a law school.'
Comments like these indicate some belief that students should be
taught to "think like lawyers." Thinking like a lawyer involved, in great
part, close analysis of cases. The anonymous respondent to a highly
critical review of Langdell's contracts casebook published in the Southern
Law Review described the practice of the case method in just these
terms. Class discussion was devoted to ascertaining "the precise point
involved in each case, ... what the court apprehended was the precise
point," alternative grounds for decision, and the analogies that could be
drawn from the courts' reasoning.' This careful parsing of the case is
at the heart of research in a common law system. It is necessary before
any argument about which law should apply to a given fact situation can
be made. As a Harvard student put it in 1893, under the case method the
student "reads hundreds upon hundreds of cases, becomes familiar with
the appearance of decisions, and, to some extent, with the practice of
courts, and learns how to digest a long case quickly and accurately."'
So central to the entire enterprise was this analysis that Eugene
292. Emlin McClain, The Best Method of Using Cases in Teaching Law, in AMERICAN
BAR ASS'N, REPORT OF THE 16TH ANNUAL MEEnNG 401, 406 (1893).
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(response to book review).
296. Lloyd M. Garrison, Methods of Instruction at American Law Schools. Ill. The
Law School of Harvard University, 6 COLUM. L. TIMES 193, 194 (1893).
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Wambaugh, a member of the Harvard Law class of 1880 and at the time
a member of the law faculty at the University of Iowa where he
introduced the case method of instruction, wrote an entire treatise on The
Study of Cases, the subtitle of which fairly describes its scope: A Course
of Instruction in Reading and Stating Reported Cases, Composing Head-
Notes and Briefs, Criticizing and Comparing Authorities, and Compiling
Digests.2"
Such learning was useful in the day-to-day practice of law. Austin
Abbott taught law at the University of the City of New York (the ancestor
of New York University) using a modified version of the case method that
preserved a prominent place for the lecture.' In his eyes, the great
advantage of the case method was the dialogue between students and
professor, which duplicated in the classroom what lawyers do in
practice.' When lawyers discuss a doubtful point of law they "get
down four or five recent or leading cases and examine them together, and
a colloquy ensues which brings out an analysis of each case," and in that
way an agreement is reached "as to what the law is on the point."'
"This is," Abbott continued, "substantially the natural course with the
Case system.""' In a paper presented to the American Bar Association
in 1894, William Keener summed up the practical advantages of the case
method in terms that probably appealed to every practicing lawyer in his
audience:
The student is required to analyze each case, to discriminate
between the relevant and the irrelevant, between the actual and
possible grounds of decision, and having thus considered the case,
he is prepared and required to deal with it in its relation to other
cases. In other words, the student is practically doing, under the
guidance of the instructor, what he will be required to do, without
guidance, as a lawyer.'
297. EUGENE WAMBAUGH, THE STUDY OF CASES (Boston, Little & Brown 1892). A
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With such training, a young lawyer could be a valuable addition to an
established practice, whether or not he had a firm grasp of those
somewhat diffuse principles that were so often asserted to be the heart of
the common law.
In contrast, Theodore Dwight's advice to his students on preparing a
case for argument, given in 1890, was quite different. "The first thing to
be done," he advised, "is to master the leading principles applying to the
case."m Only then should the reports be consulted.304 Dwight's advice
on what the lawyer should do with the reports was brief. The lawyer
should first make sure that all the authorities that could be cited by his
opponent were good law, determining whether they have been overruled
or whether "they conflict with well established principles." 5 The
lawyer must decide whether a case has been restricted to its facts, or
distinguished from a later case, or whether it consists of dictum, but
Dwight gave no hint that he was concerned with teaching those
techniques.' For Dwight, legal education did not include intensive
instruction in the analysis of cases.' Instruction by the case method
did, and presumably for that reason it was a better method of preparation
for the actual practice of the law in a legal world swamped by reported
cases. A pedagogical innovation based on ideas of what learning was about
became an intensely practical tool for training members of the profession.
V.
The case method, therefore, was in part a practical response to
changing conditions of practice. It is possible that the "Dwight method"
of teaching primarily from treatises was destined for substantial
modification in whatever institution it was applied. What then is the worth
of the legacy of Dwight, his co-workers, and the old Columbia that New
York Law School inherited? This article suggests that it is not principally
opposition to the case method, an opposition that did not long endure. The
true heritage of New York Law School is the belief that legal education
is valuable for all those who wish to practice law in all its variety, be they
devoted primarily to corporate litigation, business practice, personal injury
and medical malpractice, service in government agencies or any of the
numerous "law jobs" that exist in our complex society. Effective teaching,
303. Theodore W. Dwight, Method of Preparing a CaseforArgunent, 4 COLUM. L.
TIMEs 1, 1 (1890).
304. Id.
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whatever method is used, benefits all those called to the bar. High
standards are not methods of exclusion, but rather challenges to be met by
diligent work and application to legal study.
